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Rectitude in International Arbitration 
by WILLIAM W. PARK 
Everything is in flux. 
Heracleitus1 
Righteousness endures forever. 
Psalm 1112 
I. LEVEL PLAYING FIELDS 
(a) Heracleitus Meets the Psalmist 
THE SOMEWHAT excessive words attributed to Heracleitus find some 
application in the current search for ethical standards applicable to arbitrators 
sitting in international disputes. New patterns of misbehaviour create new types of 
ethical challenges. Few criteria for evaluating arbitrator independence and 
impartiality will likely stay foolproof for long, given how ingenious fools often 
prove themselves to be. 
Heracleitus notwithstanding, however, change does not occupy the entirety of 
human experience. Although tomorrow cannot be built on an assumption of 
yesterday's permanence, one must build on something. Yesterday's lessons remain 
better starting points than most. Thus the aspirational model of righteousness 
continues to manifest a stubborn stability, much as the Psalmist predicted. 
Professor of Law, Boston University. Adapted from a symposium contribution published in (2009) 46 San Diego 
L Rev. 629. Copyright © William W. Park, 2009 & 2011. 
1
 Transliterated panta rhei and attributed to Heracleitus of Ephesus (535-475 BCE) by Plato and Aristode, the 
phrase likely derives from a statement that we never step twice into the same river because new waters flow on 
us. See Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments 370-80 (G.S. Kirk (ed. and trans.), 1978). In Greek thought the idea is 
an old one. By contrast, Hebrew and Christian scriptures often juxtapose human transience with divine 
permanence. According to the prophet Isaiah, 'All flesh is grass. . . The grass withers, the flower fades; but the 
word of our God will stand forever'. Isaiah 40:6-8, as quoted in shortened form in 1 Peter 1:24-25. 
2
 The full text of Psalm 111, verse 3 reads, 'Full of honor and majesty is the Lord's work, and His righteousness 
endures forever'. 
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No less than in other areas of the law, elaboration of standards for arbitrator 
ethics implicates a tension between the transient and the permanent.3 Conflict-of-
interest principles will remain useful only if implemented with sensitivity to new 
trouble spots. Traditional ethical models serve as starting points for evaluating the 
fitness of those to whom business managers, investors, and nations entrust their 
treasure and their welfare. Any model, however, must be flexible enough to address 
novel professional temptations. In particular, vigilance commends itself when 
lawyers take on various professional roles, making arguments as advocates in one 
case about propositions that remain open in other cases where they sit as 
arbitrators. The constant movement in arbitrators' lives and activities requires 
regular adjustment in both formulation and application of contours for acceptable 
and unacceptable arbitrator behaviour.4 
(b) Why Bias Matters 
No one with a dog in the fight should judge the competition.5 Nor should anyone 
serve as a referee in a game after having decided which team will win. At least as 
an aspirational model, legal claims should be decided on their merits, rather than 
according to a predisposition or interest in the outcome. Consequently, few tasks 
present the vital urgency of establishing standards for evaluating the independence 
and impartiality of arbitrators.6 
The phrase 'transient and permanent' seems first to have appeared in a sermon by a New Englander named 
Theodore Parker, delivered at the ordination of Charles Shackford in the Hawes Place Church in Boston in 
May 1841. Theodore Parker, 'The Transient and Permanent in Christianity' in George Willis Cooke (ed.), The 
Transient and Permanent in Christianity (1908), p. 447. The Unitarian preacher unsettled much of his community 
by suggesting that the message of Jesus was valuable solely because of the truth it revealed, not due to any 
divine credentials. 
4
 Important ethical questions related to legal counsel (how lawyers behave in international arbitration) remain 
beyond the scope of this article. Such matters involve the propriety of interviewing witnesses (impermissible 
under deontological principles of many European bar association rules) and the duty to abide by the mandates 
of a lawyer's own jurisdiction when practising in connection with a foreign arbitration. See e.g., Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct (2009), Rule 8.5 cmt 7 (providing that the choice of law provision applies to 'lawyers 
engaged in transnational practice'). A lawyer admitted to practice in one jurisdiction may be subject to 
disciplinary authority there regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. The choice of law provision 
makes reference to both the jurisdiction in which the relevant tribunal sits and the jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer's conduct occurred. See Cyrus Benson, 'Can Professional Ethics Wait? The Need for Transparency in 
International Arbitration' in (2009) 3 Disp. Resol. Int'l 78, available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/ 
Documents/Benson-CanProfessional EthicsWait.pdf; Janet Walker, 'Ethics in Arbitration for Counsel and 
Arbitrators' in (2009) 14 Arbitration Committee Newsletter (IBA, March), p. 10 (reporting on the IBA session on 
Ethics in Arbitration sponsored on 13 October 2008). See generally, Catherine A. Rogers, 'Lawyers Without 
Borders' in (2009) 30 U Pa. J Int'l L 1035. 
5
 The more traditional formulation of this principle has been expressed in the maxim nemo judex in parte sua ('no 
one may judge his own case'). See e.g., Matthew Gearing, "A Judge in His Own Cause?": Actual or 
Unconscious Bias of Arbitrators' in (2000) 3 Int'l Arb. L Rev. 46. 
Just as 'location, location, location' comprise the three key elements in sustainable real estate value, so it has 
been observed that 'arbitrator, arbitrator, arbitrator' endure as the most critical factors in the integrity of any 
arbitration. In the same vein, another real estate maxim that might find application to arbitrators says that 
'price is what you pay, but value is what you get'. 
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Notwithstanding the elusiveness of perfect objectivity, a reasonable measure of 
arbitrator integrity remains both desirable and attainable.7 Although few people 
are free of predispositions in an absolute sense, some will prove relatively more 
detached than others with respect to any given dispute. A relative measure of 
distance from troubling connections to litigants, along with a willingness to listen 
carefully to both sides of a dispute, constitutes essential elements of basic due 
process.8 
In a cross-border context, the prohibition on bias justifies itself by reference to 
the very same goal underlying the decision to arbitrate: promoting a level playing 
field. A commitment to subject future disputes to arbitration usually aims to 
enhance a relative measure of adjudicatory neutrality, at least when compared 
with the prospect of the other side's hometown courts. Indeed, the notion that 
promises are meant to be kept depends in large measure on private arbitration for 
continuing vigour. Even if speed and economy prove illusory, arbitration can still 
serve to enhance the perception as well as the reality of procedural fairness, thus 
promoting respect for the parties' shared ex ante expectations at the time of the 
contract or investment. 
In a world of stubbornly heterogeneous legal cultures, each with its own 
divergent view of proper conduct, elaborating one common ethical plumb line for 
international arbitration poses special challenges.9 In contrast to national legal 
communities, which tend to adopt relatively formalised paths for appointing 
judges, the fragmented framework of international arbitration relies on more fluid 
processes for selecting decision-makers and vetting their integrity. For instance, 
direct party-nomination of arbitrators coexists with arbitrator selection by 
Somewhat ironically, while impartiality gains ground in arbitration, it has been questioned in some quarters 
with respect to judicial decision-making, most recently by supporters of Judge Sonia Sotomayor in connection 
with her nomination to the US Supreme Court. See David Brooks (op-ed.), 'The Empathy Issue' in New fork 
Times, 29 May 2009, p. A25; Ellen Goodman (op-ed.), 'What's So Bad About Empathy?' in Boston Globe, 22 
May 2009, p. A15. To some extent, albeit with considerably more intelligence and moderation, the call for 
empathy echoes many of the slogans in the Critical Legal Studies movement of American academia during 
the 1980s. For a short history of that movement, see Mark Tushnet, 'Critical Legal Studies: A Political History' 
in (1991) 100 Yak LJ 1515. For a contrasting view that emphasises the deliberative nature of judicial 
decision-making, see Chris Guthrie et ai, 'Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases' in (2007) 93 
Cornell LRev.l, and Michael Mustill, 'What Do Judges Do?' in (1995-1996) Juridisk Tidsknft 611 (Sweden). 
Although 'due process' is used more within the United States, 'natural justice' finds favour in the British 
tradition. In his famous defence of the Dartmouth College charter, Daniel Webster asked rhetorically whether 
the college trustees 'lost their franchises by "due course and process of law?'". He continued that the law 'hears 
before it condemns' and'renders judgment only after trial'. Trustees of Dartmouth Collegev. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819). The French speak of'adversarial process' (procedure contradictoire or principe de la 
contradiction), and the Germans refer to 'right to a hearing in accordance with law' (Anspruch aufrechtliches Gehrn). 
In public international law, bias against foreign investors unable to vindicate rights in a host state's legal 
system will give rise to claims for' [d] enial of justice'. &Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005), 
p. 4. 
A weighted cord used to determine verticality, the plumb line has served as a metaphor for ethical standards 
since Biblical times, when the prophet Amos spoke of God setting a 'plumb line in the midst of. . . Israel' to 
judge the rectitude of a people found morally warped and in need of correction. Amos 7:8. 
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institutional appointing authorities;10 national court decisions on arbitrator 
impartiality intersect with analogous rules and decisions of arbitral institutions; 
and guidelines issued by professional associations are interpreted by scholars and 
practitioners from disparate procedural traditions. 
This hodgepodge of influences serves as a backdrop for both honest and 
spurious challenges to arbitrators. Some objections will be advanced in good faith, 
based on genuine concerns about an arbitrator's exercise of independent 
judgments. In other instances, however, requests to remove arbitrators or to vacate 
awards represent no more than attempts to derail proceedings or to reverse 
unwanted decisions. 
Cynics sometimes suggest that litigants want fairness much less than they want 
victory. The two goals need not be incompatible. In many contexts they intersect. 
What limited empirical research does exist seems to indicate that parties to 
arbitration place 'fair and just results' high in their pantheon of virtues, regardless 
of whether, in the heat of battle, they focus more on victory. *' 
Common sense and general experience reinforce this conclusion. In appointing 
arbitrators, it would be rare indeed for counsel to seek candidates known to be dull 
or dishonest, admitting their client's case to be so weak that success can come only 
through trickery or bribes. Rather, fair-mindedness and intelligence remain the 
most sought after qualities in arbitrators. 
(c) Two Ways to Sabotage Arbitration 
Seeking to bring arbitration into disrepute, an evil gremlin might contemplate two 
starkly different routes. One route would tolerate appointment of pernicious 
arbitrators, biased and unable to judge independently. An alternate route to 
shipwreck, also reducing confidence in the integrity of the arbitral process, would 
establish unrealistic ethical standards that render the arbitrator's position 
precarious and susceptible to destabilisation by litigants engaged in dilatory tactics 
or seeking to annul unfavourable awards.12 
There are several of these institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), 
and the International Centre for the Setdement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
A study by the Global Center for Dispute Resolution (an affiliate of the American Arbitration Association) 
found that attorneys and parties to arbitrations rated a 'fair and just result' as the most important element in 
arbitration, above all other considerations including cost, finality, speed and privacy. See Richard W. Naimark 
and Stephanie E. Keer, 'International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of 
Attorneys and Business People' in (2002) 30 Int'lBus. L. 203; see also Richard W. Naimark and Stephanie E. 
Keer, 'What Do Parties Really Want from International Commercial Arbitration?' in (2002-2003) 57 Disp. 
Res. J 78 (publishing same results). Both prior to the first hearing and after the award, parties to international 
commercial arbitrations were asked to rank the importance of eight variables: (i) speed; (ii) privacy; (iii) 
receipt of monetary award; (iv) fair and just result; (v) cost-efficiency; (vi) finality of decision; (vii) arbitrator 
expertise; and (viii) continuing relationship with opposing party. Claimants and respondents alike ranked 'fair 
and just result' higher (90 per cent for respondents and 75 per cent for claimants) than any other variable. 
In at least one instance, an arbitral award rendered in Zurich was challenged because the presiding 
arbitrator's law firm had turned down a potential client to avoid possible conflicts. The losing party argued 
that the loss of potential business caused the arbitrator to become biased. The highest court in Switzerland 
(Tribunal federal or Bundesgericht) dismissed the challenge in Rhone-Poulenc Rom Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Roche 
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To reduce the risk of having cases decided by either pernicious or precarious 
arbitrators, those who establish and apply ethical guidelines walk a tightrope 
between the rival poles of (i) keeping arbitrators free from taint, and (ii) avoiding 
manoeuvres that interrupt proceedings unduly. From the command post of bland 
generalities, the job of evaluating independence or impartiality may seem simple. 
In light of specific challenges, however, the task becomes one of nuance and 
complexity, often implicating subtle wrinkles to the comportment of otherwise 
honourable and experienced individuals. 
The quest for balance in ethical standards entails a spectrum of situations in 
which mere perceptions of bias may be given weight equal to real bias. To promote 
the litigants' trust in the arbitral process, an arbitrator might sometimes step down 
just to alleviate one side's discomfort. Not always, however. In some instances it 
would be wrong to permit proceedings to be disrupted by unreasonable fears, 
whether real or feigned. 
If arbitrators must be completely sanitised from all possible external influences 
on their decisions, only the most naive or incompetent would be available. 
Consequently, notions such as 'proximity' and 'intensity' will be invoked to evaluate 
allegedly disqualifying links or prejudgment. As we shall see, the search for balance 
in ethical standards compels a constant re-evaluation of the type of relationships 
and predispositions likely to trouble international arbitration. 
II. P R O B L E M A T I C R E L A T I O N S H I P S A N D A T T I T U D E S 
(a) The Basics: Independence and Impartiality 
Arbitrator conflicts of interest usually fall into one of two categories: lack of 
independence and lack of impartiality. In common usage, independence refers to 
the absence of improper connections,13 while impartiality addresses matters 
related to prejudgment.14 The common assumption is that an arbitrator in 
international disputes must be both impartial and independent.15 
Lack of independence derives from what might be called problematic 
relationships between the arbitrator and one party or its lawyer. Often these result 
Diagnostic Corp., 17 February 2000, 172 Die Praxis des Bundesgerichts (Basel) [Pra.] 4, 1999 (Switz.). The 
challenge was based, inter alia, on arts. 190(2)(e) of the Swiss Conflicts of Law Code (LDIP/IPRG), which 
permits award annulment for violation of 'public policy' (ordre public in both the French and the German 
texts). For better or for worse, in Swiss arbitration law notions of bias and partiality are subsumed under the 
broader category of public policy violations. 
The taxonomy is not entirely satisfactory, however. An arbitrator might be 'independent' in the sense of not 
having any financial or personal links, yet still be 'partial' to one side because of a friendship (or animosity) 
with respect to one of the lawyers. The chairman of a three-member arbitral tribunal might sometimes be 
referred to as 'the neutral' even though all three arbitrators, in line with increasingly common practice, would 
be required to be independent. 
See generally, the excellent survey by Loretta Malintoppi, 'Independence, Impartiality, and Duty of Disclosure 
of Arbitrators' in Peter Muchlinski et al. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008), pp. 789, 
807. 
See IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2004) General Standard 1, 2, 
available at www.ibanet.org/Document/ Default.aspx? DocumentUid=E2FE5E72-EB14-4BBA-B10D-
D33DAFEE8918 (TBA Guidelines'). 
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from financial dealings (such as business transactions and investments), ties of a 
sentimental quality (including friendships and family), or links of group 
identification (for example, shared nationality and professional or social 
affiliations). Individuals should decline appointment if they have doubts about 
their ability to be impartial or independent, or if facts exist such as to raise 
reasonable concerns on either score. 
Even if no special relationship or financial link exists with either side, a second 
category of concerns will arise if an arbitrator appears to have prejudged some 
matter. An arbitrator might be independent but still be a bigot, with low opinions 
about people of a particular race, nationality or religion. This second category 
(often called 'actual bias') was illustrated by the English decision arising from a 
maritime accident off the coast of France, between a Portuguese and a Norwegian 
vessel, submitted to arbitration in London by the two respective ship-owners.16 
During hearings, counsel for one side mentioned a case involving Italians. To 
which, the arbitrator responded as follows: 
Italians are all liars in these cases and will say anything to suit their book. The same thing applies 
to the Portuguese. But the other side here are Norwegians and in my experience the Norwegians 
generally are a truthful people. In this case I entirely accept the evidence of the master of the [the 
Norwegian vessel]. 
In connection with the application to remove the offending arbitrator, it was 
argued that a formal award not having yet been rendered, there was no evidence 
that an ultimate decision against the Portuguese would in fact rest on the biased 
perspective. Rejecting what might be called an argument too clever by half, the 
court confirmed that justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done. 
The arbitrator was removed. 
More subde examples of prejudgment might include a procedural order that 
presumes contested facts on which evidence has not been heard. In other instances, 
an arbitrator might have written an article or delivered a speech taking a firm 
position on otherwise open questions that remain central and controversial in the 
dispute. 
No magic attaches to this conceptual framework. Independence and 
impartiality serve merely as intellectual hooks on which to hang analysis with 
respect to two basic principles expected of arbitrators.17 No arbitrator should have 
In re The Owners of the Steamship Catalina and The Owners of the Motor Vessel Norma [1938] 61 Lloyd's Rep. 360 
(Eng.). Thanks to my friend Prof. Loukas Mistelis for correcting the misimpression that it was the Greeks, 
rather than the Portuguese, who were the liars. 
Much of the pioneering work in this field has been done by Catherine Rogers. See e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, 
Ethics in International Arbitration (2009); Catherine A. Rogers, 'The Ethics of International Arbitrators' in 
Lawrence W. Newman and Richard D. Hill (eds.), The Leading Arbitrators' Guide to International Arbitration (2008), 
p. 621; Catherine A. Rogers,'The Vocation of the International Arbitrator' in (2005) Am. UInt'l LRev. 957. 
For an Australian perspective on the matter, see Samuel Luttrell, Bias Challenges in International Commercial 
Arbitration (2009). For a survey of analogous principles applicable to judges who sit on international tribunals, 
see generally, The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary (ILA, 2004), 
available at www.ucl.ac.uk/ laws/cict/docs/burgh_fmal_21204.pdf 
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links with either side that provide an economic or emotional stake in the outcome 
of the case. And no arbitrator should decide a controverted matter prior to hearing 
evidence and argument. 
A third notion, sometimes called 'neutrality', generally encompasses both 
independence and impartiality. This term takes on a special connotation for 
domestic arbitration within the United States, which traditionally distinguished 
between 'neutral' and 'non-neutral' arbitrators.18 
One useful formulation of the type of the independence required of arbitrators 
might be found in the notion of'relative reversibility' as between the two sides.19 
Under this approach, an arbitrator would be independent as between an Israeli 
seller and an Egyptian buyer if his predisposition toward one side or the other 
would not change on reversal of the parties' nationalities. In that particular 
context, a French or Swiss arbitrator might be characterised as more neutral than 
an Israeli or an Egyptian. This does not mean that an Israeli or an Egyptian 
arbitrator would lack integrity. Rather, a perception might exist that it would be 
asking too much of either one to judge the dispute. 
Of course, an arbitrator may deviate from duty through avenues other than 
prejudgment and inappropriate relationships. The contours of integrity touch on 
matters as diverse as delegation of tasks,20 participation in settlement 
negotiations,21 and inappropriate interviews with party representatives.22 
Nevertheless, independence and impartiality constitute the core of arbitrator 
integrity, and continue to be emphasised at professional symposia23 and in the 
literature.24 
See Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (2004), note on neutrality, available at 
www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial_disputes.pdf ('AAA/ABA Code of Ethics'). The 2004 version 
establishes a presumption of neutrality unless the parties agree otherwise, in which event the non-neutral 
individuals will be governed by the tenth set of principles in the Code of Ethics. Ibid. Canon X. 
See generally, William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation in (1995) 12 J Int'lArb. 99. 
Normally, arbitral duties should not be delegated. See AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 18 at Canon V(C). 
See also Note from the Secretariat of the ICC Court concerning Appointment of Administrative Secretaries 
by Arbitral Tribunals in (1995) ICC Int'lCtArb. Bull. (November), pp. 77, 78, which provides that the work of 
any secretary (somewhat analogous to the clerk of a US judge) 'must be strictly limited to administrative tasks' 
and that the secretary 'must not influence in any manner whatsoever the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal'. 
Section 4(d) of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest provides, inter alia, that before attempting to assist 
the parties in reaching a settlement, the arbitrator should 'receive an express agreement by the parties that 
acting in such a manner shall not disqualify the arbitrator from continuing to serve as arbitrator'. IBA 
Guidelines, supra n. 15 at s. 4(d). The Guidelines continue, 'Such express agreement shall be considered to be 
an effective waiver of any potential conflict of interest that may arise from the arbitrator's participation in 
such process or from information that the arbitrator may learn in the process'. Ibid.; see generally, Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler, 'When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a Transnational Standard' in (2009) 25 
Arb. Int'l 187, adapted from Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Clayton Utz Lecture at the University of Sydney, 
9 October 2007. 
For example, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Practice Guidelines No. 16 ('The Interviewing of 
Prospective Arbitrators') provides in s. 13(4) that a sole arbitrator should not normally be interviewed except 
by the parties jointly. Practice Guidelines, guideline 16, available at www. ciarb.org/information-and-
resources/practice-guidelines-and-protocols/list-of-guidelines-and- protocols. 
See e.g., ICC Int'l CtArb. Bull. (2007 Special Supp.) (February 2008), a special supplement entitled 'Independence 
of Arbitrators', with contributions by Louis Epstein ('Arbitrator Independence and Bias: The View of a 
Corporate In-House Counsel'); Dominique Hascher (A Comparison between the Independence of State 
Justice and the Independence of Arbitration'); Ahmed S. El-Kosheiri and Karim Y. Youssef ('The 
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(b) Can Integrity Be Waived? 
One intriguing question relates to the extent that either independence or 
impartiality may be waived by fully informed litigants. In some circles the answer 
seems to be a conditional ' y e s \ at least with respect to independence, even if not 
necessarily so for impartiality. The International Bar Association Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines) contain a 'Red 
List' of prohibited relationships that bifurcates into waivable and non-waivable 
relationships. The former include, inter alia, an arbitrator who acts for a litigant in 
the case, or is a member of the same firm as counsel to one side. The latter 
encompass an arbitrator's service as director in a corporation that is party to the 
case or as adviser to his or her appointing party.25 
Independence thus seems to lend itself to waiver up to the point where the 
litigant actually becomes judge of its own cause. At that moment the decision-
making process may no longer bear the attributes permitting its enforcement as an 
'award' under relevant statutes and treaties. Although a mother might well referee 
games among her children, deciding a quarrel between her son and his schoolmate 
would be a different matter. Likewise, it would be impermissible for an arbitrator 
to own a majority interest in one of the parties, no matter how much he or she 
might try to be fair. 
A recent case tested the extent to which arbitrator integrity can be waived in an 
international context.26 A dispute arose over distribution of a Biblical citrus fruit 
called the esrog (or etrog), used in connection with the Jewish Harvest festival of 
Succoth.27 An American distributor refused to pay the balance due for imported 
fruit, complaining that the Israeli grower had circumvented the exclusive 
distributorship by selling to third parties. The controversy was submitted to 
arbitration before an Israeli clergyman who found in favour of the grower. 
The award was presented for enforcement in the United States under the New 
York Convention.28 The distributor resisted confirmation, arguing that the 
arbitrator was not independent, due to services rendered to the grower by 
certifying the orchard's kosher status, which was essential to maintaining the fruit's 
marketability. 
Independence of International Arbitrators: An Arbitrator's Perspective'); Lord Steyn ('England: The 
Independence and/or Impartiality of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration'); Francois Terre 
('Independence and Arbitrators'); Anne Marie Whitesell ('Independence in ICC Arbitration'); and Otto L.O. 
de Witt Wijnen ('The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration Three Years On'). 
See essays collected in a special issue on arbitrator bias in Transnational Dispute Management (July 2008), available 
at www.transnational-dispute-management.com/ (subscription required). 
See IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at Pt II, ss. 1-2. See also discussion infra. 
Schwartzman v. Harlap, No. 08 Civ. 4990(BMC), 2009 WL 1009856 (E.D.N.Y. April 13, 2009). 
The fourth book of Moses (Leviticus 23:40) mentions the fruit of the 'godly' or 'beautiful' tree, which Jewish 
tradition interprets to be the esrog. The week-long festival of Succoth falls in autumn for the Northern 
Hemisphere, and memorialises the booths or 'tabernacles' used during the 40 years of Hebrew wandering 
from Egypt after the Exodus. 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 10 June 
11958,21 UST 2517,330 UNTS 38 ('New York Convention'). This convention is also called the 1958 United 
Nations Arbitration Convention. 
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The court rejected the challenge, finding that the distributor knew of the 
arrangement and thus waived a right to complain. The assumption seems to have 
been that the right to a fair hearing could be waived, or at the least that objections 
must be raised in a timely fashion. From a practical perspective this seems 
reasonable. Otherwise, a litigant might simply hope for a successful outcome, 
raising the conflict only if things do not end with a happy result. 
How far this result can be pushed remains open to question. The case concerned 
lack of independence, not positive prejudgment. Although interrelated, 
independence and impartiality are not the same thing. Prejudgment would seem to 
impede the very heart of the arbitral process, which presumes a quasi-judicial 
function of deciding legal claims after weighing evidence and argument. The lack 
of independence may create an imperfect arbitration, but prejudgment renders the 
process a sham formality, an unnecessary social cost. Although the New York 
Convention contains no definition of arbitration, prejudgment seems entirely foreign 
to the process whose recognition the treaty contemplates. 
Nothing prevents enforcement of an arbitrator's decision simply as a matter of 
contract. However, actors in cross-border commerce seek something more than 
just a contractual framework for arbitration. The New York Convention and its 
antecedents (the Geneva Convention and Geneva Protocol of 1927 and 1923, 
respectively) grew from dissatisfaction with contract law alone as a remedy for 
failure to respect arbitration commitments. The commercial community sought to 
facilitate enforcement of arbitrators' decisions as awards, not simple contracts.29 
The legal matrix for such enforcement presumes a minimum level of 
impartiality in the arbitrator's respect for the parties' right to be heard.30 Likewise, 
for investor-state arbitration the ICSID Convention requires arbitrators to be 
persons 'who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment' and permits 
challenge of an award for 'departure from a fundamental rule of procedure'.31 
Although litigants might waive impartiality as a matter of contract, in so doing 
they may well remove their dispute from the legal framework applicable to the 
creature we call arbitration. 
Not all agree, however, with such a balance between freedom of contract and 
arbitral integrity. One of the most thoughtful scholarly commentators argues that 
ethical questions should resolve themselves into issues of contract interpretation.32 
At least one respectable current in French legal thinking posits the existence of an independent juridical 
status for arbitration (Vordrejuridique arbitral} that seems to hover somewhere above and beyond what might be 
called the normal framework for national arbitration law. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Aspects philosophiques du droit 
de I'arbitrage international (2008), originally published in (2007) 329 Recuil des Cours (Hague Academy of 
International Law). 
New York Convention, Art. V(l)(b) provides for non-recognition when the losing party was 'unable to present 
his case'. The French text talks about the impossibility of a party 'de faire valoir ses moyens'. Likewise, the 
Federal Arbitration Act permits vacatur in the event of'evident partiality' by the arbitrator. 9 USC s. 10(a)(2) 
(2006). 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, arts. 
14(1), 52(l)(d), 18 March 1965, 17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159 ('ICSID Convention'). 
Alan Scott Rau, 'On Integrity in Private Judging' in (1998) 14 Arb. Int'l 115, adapted from Alan Scott Rau, 
'Integrity in Private Judging'in (1997) 38 S Tex. LRev. 485. See also Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon and Ross, Inc., 28 
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Even if this perspective might prevail in certain jurisdictions, it does not necessarily 
commend itself as the better view as a policy matter. One remembers words 
attributed to Talleyrand to the effect that the excessive becomes meaningless: 'Tout 
ce qui est excessif devient insignifiant'. 
(c) The Devil in the Detail 
(i) Clear conflicts 
Most analysis starts with relatively clear models on which most reasonable people 
agree, and then proceeds from black and white to shades of gray. An arbitrator 
who says French people exaggerate should not judge a case with a respondent 
from Paris. And an arbitrator should not become romantically entangled with a 
lawyer representing one side in the case.33 Equally settled is the proposition that an 
arbitrator will not be disqualified merely because once, during a mid-morning 
coffee break at a professional lecture, he chatted with a lawyer appearing before 
him in a case. 
Nuances appear at some point between extremes. The somewhat ambiguous 
notion of friendship might encompass business associates who occasionally share a 
meal, as well as confidants who exchange regular calls and visits. In some cases, the 
shared cup of coffee can become a deeper relationship that results in arbitrator 
disqualification. 
(ii) Variations on a theme 
Although some behaviour patterns provide per se evidence of impropriety, other 
types of conduct take on radically different ethical overtones depending on the 
circumstances. For example, arbitrators concerned about committing time for 
distant hearings might build into their terms of appointment provisions to cover 
days reserved but ultimately not used due to the parties' decision to cancel without 
adequate notice. In some instances, a retainer might be requested to cover such an 
eventuality. If properly disclosed to all parties and requested prior to accepting the 
time commitment, such an arrangement might not pose any problem.34 However, 
F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994), in which Judge Posner suggests that 'short of authorizing trial by battle or 
ordeal, or more doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they 
want to govern the arbitration of their disputes'. 
For a tale of room sharing by an arbitrator and a lawyer appearing before him in a case, see Richard B. 
Schmitt, 'Suite Sharing' in Wall Street Journal, 14 February 1990, p. Al. On two different nights, a video 
camera caught an arbitrator entering and leaving the hotel suite for one of the lawyers in his case. The 
attorney claimed that the arbitrator initially stayed with her because she had felt ill and he was concerned for 
her health. On the second night, said the attorney, the arbitrator was waiting for a lost briefcase that was not 
found until late evening, by which time he no longer had a room. The concerned attorney thus offered to 
share her room with him again. Ibid. 
See e.g., K/S Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Indus. Co. [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 524 (CA) (Eng.) (holding the 
arbitrators did not misconduct themselves in seeking security for remuneration with respect to 12 weeks of 
hearings scheduled for two years in the future). 
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a retainer paid by only one party, and not revealed to the other side, might well be 
seen as a bribe, and understandably so.35 
More subtle factors can also colour perceptions and evaluations on conflicts of 
interest. Was a gap in the curriculum vitae intentional or inadvertent?36 Was the 
arbitrator's previous consulting work for one of the parties significant?37 Does a 
former law firm affiliation create a perception of continuing links? The 
appreciation of a conflict might vary depending on whether it is expressed in a 
positive or a negative fashion. Is an 'independent' arbitrator the same as one who 
is 'not biased' toward either side? 
Often it will be important whether a lawyer serving as an arbitrator practices in 
partnership with a firm whose other members represent affiliates of the litigants. 
On occasion, however, an arbitrator may be tainted even without the status of 
employee or partner. One Paris Court of Appeal judgment addressed a situation in 
which a lawyer with the Paris office of a large multinational law firm had failed, 
apparently by simple inadvertence, to disclose all links between his firm and one of 
the parties.38 Although neither a partner nor associate (but simply 'of counsel') to 
the law firm, the lawyer was found to be constitutionally connected (structurellement 
lie) with the Paris office to an extent requiring attribution of the firm's conflicts.39 
A general standard of independence usually takes meaning only as applied to 
specific cases, some of which resist facile analysis. Should an arbitrator be 
disqualified if he or she sits on the board of a financial institution that manages 
pension funds holding shares of affiliates of one of the parties? If so, does it matter 
how large the institution, or how sizeable the ownership of interest might be in 
proportion to the entire portfolio? 
If it seems obvious that an arbitrator should not sit when he or she represents 
one of the parties, does the same rule apply when his firm represented an affiliate 
in an unconnected matter five years ago? What about one year ago? Or ten? If it 
seems obvious that an arbitrator should not be having a romance with a lawyer for 
one of the parties, the same conclusion will not necessarily be self-evident with 
respect to a witness with whom a good friendship existed during university days. In 
determining when a professional acquaintance becomes a disqualifying 
relationship, the devil will be very much in the detail of how regularly the two 
might dine together. 
See e.g., Lawrence F. Ebb, 'A Tale of Three Cities: Arbitrator Misconduct by Abuse of Retainer and 
Commitment Fee Arrangements' in (1992) 3 Am. Rev. Int'lArb. 177, 181-90 (discussing State oflsraelv. Desert 
Exploration), as reprinted in W. Michael Reisman, W. Laurence Craig,, Willliam W. Park and Jan Paulsson, 
International Commercial Arbitration (1997), p. 603. 
See AT&T Corp. v.Saudi Cable Co. [2000] 2 Uoyd's Rep. 127, 137 (CA) (Eng.), available at 2000 WL 571190. 
See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cos. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). Compare the competing approaches of 
Justices Black (requiring disclosure of any relationship),White (calling for scrutiny only of non-trivial links) 
and Fortas (focusing on actual bias). 
See La SAJandPAvax SA v. Societe Tecnimont SPA, Cour d'appel Paris, le ch., sec. C, 12 February 2009, (2009) 
Rev. Arb. 186, note Clay. 
The award was vacated under art. 1502(2) of the French Code de procedure civile, providing for annulment 
when an arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted (tribunal irregulmement compose). The International 
Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (ICC Rules) applicable to the particular case require 
independence of all arbitrators. 
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Should national origin matter? Should it matter that an arbitrator is an 
American of Korean ancestry presiding in a dispute between a Korean claimant 
and a Japanese respondent?40 And what about religion? In a domestic commercial 
arbitration, one would not normally expect an arbitrator being challenged for 
being Muslim or Hindu.41 Would the same calm insouciance toward religious 
affiliation obtain with respect to arbitration of a border dispute between Pakistan 
and India? 
Likewise, the very existence of professional expertise can present an ethical 
conundrum. If a scholar has expressed a firm opinion on a narrow and 
controverted point on which the case hangs, she may not inspire confidence in the 
party that received the rough side of the academic analysis. However, learned 
professionals do (and should) write treatises sharing their knowledge. A professor of 
contract law at a US law school would not normally be disqualified for having 
written about 'offer and acceptance'. It would be a shame to exclude from service 
those who really know something, leaving arbitration only to the ignorant. 
(d) The Parties' Role in Arbitrator Selection 
To promote confidence in the international arbitral process, party input into the 
selection of arbitrators has long been common practice. Even limited interview of 
candidates by counsel has been allowed, at least with safeguards to avoid discussion 
of the merits of the case.42 Rightly or wrongly, litigants often perceive a benefit in 
direct selection of a tribunal, rather than leaving the choice entirely to an 
institution. By vetting a proposed arbitrator, the party may feel more comfortable 
that the case will be decided by someone who is skilled, fair, and perhaps even 
smart. 
Those unfamiliar with international arbitration sometimes express surprise at 
the degree of party involvement in the selection process, suggesting that it may 
inject a corrupting influence on the independence of arbitrators. Yet the 
justification for a heightened party participation will be evident after a moment of 
See generally, Ilhyung Lee, 'Practice and Predicament: the Nationality of the International Arbitrator' in (2008) 
31 Fordhamlnt'lLJ 603. 
The obverse might be less certain, however. The High Court of London has sustained a challenge to an 
arbitrator because he was not Muslim. An arbitration clause in a joint venture between two Muslim 
businessmen provided for a tribunal drawn exclusively from the Ismaili community, a branch of Shi'a Islam 
led by Aga Khan. One side resisted the other's attempt to appoint a retired English judge who was not 
Ismaili. The party seeking to confirm the appointment argued that to bar non-Muslims would constitute 
religious discrimination in violation of English law. The court rejected that argument and upheld the 
constitution of an all-Ismaili tribunal. See Nurdin Jivraj v. Sadruddin Hashward [2009] EWHC (Comm) 1364 
(Eng.). This result accords with the way many courts treat proceedings before a Beth Din (court of Jewish law) 
when all parties have accepted its jurisdiction. See e.g., Jfjeilerv. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (business 
partnership); Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343 (D.C. 2005) (bylaws of Jewish congregation); 
Avit&tr v. Avitzur, 108 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983) (prenuptial agreement). See generally, Michael C. Grossman, 'Is 
This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review and Due Process' in (2007) 107 Colum. L. Rev. 169; 
Ginnie Fried, 'The Collision of Church and State: Primer to Beth Din Arbitration and the New York Secular 
Courts' in (2004) 31 Fordham Urb. LJ 633. 
See generally, Practice Guidelines, guideline 16, supra n. 22. 
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mature reflection on the difference between national and international 
proceedings. 
In a relatively homogeneous and integrated juridical environment, the 
individuals selected as judges (or at an earlier stage, the principal candidates for 
judgeships) will be well known to the other members of the legal profession (as in 
England and the United States), or will have been selected by nationally 
administered examination, as in countries following the French model.43 They will 
likely know each other, direcdy or indirectly, through university, court 
appearances, or professional associations. Shifting from selection of judges to 
choice of arbitrators, within a single-country framework, a national institution may 
well inspire some measure of analogous confidence as an appointing authority, as 
for example the American Arbitration Association generally commands in the 
United States. 
By contrast, if an American company has a dispute with the Chinese 
government, the two sides may not be equally comfortable with any single 
appointing authority framework. The party from the United States may like the 
American Arbitration Association, while the Chinese may favour the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). Even 
venerable institutions of long standing, such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) or the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), may 
be suspect to some observers as dominated by interests and traditions of 
industrialised nations.44 
In such circumstances, the task of constructing a mutually acceptable arbitral 
tribunal would normally be facilitated by allowing each side to appoint an 
arbitrator, and having the two party-nominated arbitrators choose the third 
member of the tribunal. Such party participation democratises the process, serving 
to foster trust that at least one person on the tribunal (the party's nominee) will 
monitor the procedural integrity of the arbitration.45 
Party participation in the constitution of a tribunal means that each side will 
want to be sure that its nominee (and the presiding arbitrator if possible) will be 
free of doctrinal predispositions that would adversely affect its case. A company 
whose assets have just been expropriated will not be keen on a tribunal dominated 
by a professor who has written a book supporting uncompensated nationalisation. 
Likewise, the host state will not want someone who has taken the position that 
French magistrats pursue civil service careers following a competitive examination and study at the Ecole 
Nationale de la Magistrature. See generally,}o\m Bell, 'Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France' 
in (1988) 61 SCalLRtv. 1757. 
The perception of such institutions as too 'pro-Western' explains much of the impetus behind the United 
Nations Conference on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. Some organisations are 
non-national in name only. For example, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution is based in New 
York and affiliated with the American Arbitration Association. 
For some institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, parties 
technically are permitted only to 'nominate' an arbitrator, with the actual appointment authority falling to 
the ICC Court, which in essence can exercise a veto over a clearly unqualified nominee. International 
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration Rules, art. 7(4). 
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national welfare must take a back seat to profit maximisation for the foreign 
investor. 
In practice, the process of evaluating ideological conflicts may shift from 
avoiding the 'wrong' arbitrator to jockeying for the 'best' arbitrator. Even if a 
litigant knows that an arbitrator cannot be in its pocket, the litigant may, 
understandably, still hope to appoint someone who falls into its corner 
doctrinally.46 Thus, rejection of the left-wing professor as tribunal chairman may 
become an effort to nominate a strong capitalist, with traditional views on 'prompt, 
adequate and effective' compensation.47 The risk in such excessive wrangling, of 
course, is that the selection process becomes unworkable, a bit like what happens 
when a schoolchild tries to sharpen a pencil to an excessively fine point. 
The game can become even more complex with respect to procedural matters. 
For instance, a party hoping to avoid extensive document production may prefer a 
French professor over an American litigator, given that US style 'discovery' 
(including requests to produce extensive documentation that may be adverse to 
one's own arguments) has traditionally been foreign to the Continental legal 
system.48 
Party input into the arbitrator selection process need not impinge on arbitrator 
integrity. Current arbitration rules and canons of ethics point to a consensus that 
now presumes independence and impartiality as the norm for all arbitrators (not 
just the chair) on a three-member tribunal, notwithstanding an assumption that 
each side will nominate an arbitrator. 
This does not mean, however, that tension never exists between the value of 
independence and the parties' desire for an advocate on the tribunal. In the 
United States, it was the case until recendy that party-appointed arbitrators were 
presumed not to be neutral.49 Moreover, scepticism about the merits of neutrality 
for party-appointed arbitrators has made a revival in some scholarly writing,50 as 
well as in the emerging protocols for arbitration pursuant to income tax treaties.51 
The late Sir Michael Kerr, a leading light of the English bar during the latter half of the twentieth century, 
once playfully recounted to the author advice he had received from a senior colleague who learned of his 
nomination as a party-appointed arbitrator. 'My boy', said the older man, 'steer a middle course between too 
much and too litde independence'. 
The doctrine of 'prompt, adequate, and effective' compensation was first introduced by Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull in his letter to the Ambassador of Mexico requesting compensation for expropriation of 
property of American nationals. For a reprint of the letter, see Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of 
International Law (1942), vol. 3, p. 659. 
For a European comparison of English and Swiss document production, see Arielle Elan Visson, Droit a la 
production de pieces et discovery: Droit federal, drois cantonaux de Vaud, Geneve, Zurich et droit anglais (1997) (Switz.). 
See AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 8, preamble; see also, Stephen G. Yusem, 'Comparing the Original with 
the Revised American Bar Association-American Arbitration Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in 
Commercial Disputes' in Metropolitan Corp. Corns. (July 2004), pp. 38, 38-39, 64 ('the judiciary has generally 
supported the concept of non-neutrality both before and after the adoption of the original Code. The 
original Code assumed that the business community desired and expected non-neutrality; however, the 
modern rules of the major institutional ADR providers require neutrality for party-appointed arbitrators' 
(citations omitted)). 
See Tony Cole, Authority and Contemporary International Arbitration , 70 Louisiana Law Rev. 801 (2010), arguing 
that party-appointed arbitrators should 'see themselves as the party's representative on the panel'. Prof. Cole 
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Ambivalence about arbitrator independence and impartiality seems to have 
been particularly marked in public international arbitration. More than a century 
ago, the US Secretary of State lamented that arbitrators in state-to-state disputes 
tended to see themselves as diplomats rather than as judicial decision-makers 
looking to the law and the facts. In a speech given in April 1907, Secretary of State 
Elihu Root opined as follows: 
It has seemed to me that the great obstacle to the universal adoption of arbitration is not the 
unwillingness of civilized nations to submit their disputes to the decision of an impartial tribunal; 
it is rather an apprehension that the tribunal selected will not be impartial.52 
Similar sentiments were included the following month in his instructions to the 
American delegates to the Second Hague Conference that revised the status for the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.53 
III. N E W F R O N T I E R S 
(a) Issue Conflict and Role Confusion 
Among the new categories for possible conflicts that continue to suggest 
themselves, increasing concern has been expressed with respect to 'issue conflict' 
and its sibling, 'role confusion'. Each represents a special form of prejudgment. 
On occasion, an arbitrator must address, in the context of an arbitration, the 
very same issue presented to him or his law firm as advocate in another case, or to 
himself as scholar in academic writings. It is not difficult to see why such situations 
might compromise the integrity of the arbitral process. The arbitrator might be 
tempted, even subconsciously, to add a sentence to an award that could later be 
suggests that such partisan behaviour will enhance understanding of the nominating party's views, but will 
not prevent the arbitrator from being independent and impartial. Ibid. 
Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, Art. 25(5) (OECD, 2008). Still in its infancy, tax treaty 
arbitration has not yet evolved into a system in which all arbitrators are genuinely independent. Although the 
new treaties contain a general prohibition on presiding arbitrators of the same nationality of either country, 
governments have not been willing to provide specific guidelines for independence of the arbitrators 
appointed by the two disputing nations, each of which may appoint government officials. See recent protocols 
for tax treaty arbitration concluded by the United States with Belgium, Canada and Germany. IRS.gov, 
Mandatory Tax Treaty Arbitration, available at www. irs.gov/businesses/international/article/ 
0„id=20T209,00.html. 
Robert Erskine Ely (ed.), Proceedings of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress (1907), p. 43. Secretary of State 
Root then quotes Lord Salisbury and goes on to say: 'The essential fact which supports that feeling, is that 
arbitrators too often act diplomatically rather than judicially; they consider themselves as belonging to 
diplomacy rather than to jurisprudence; they measure their responsibility and their duty by the traditions, the 
sentiments and the sense of honorable obligation which have grown up in the centuries of diplomatic 
intercourse, rather than by the traditions, the sentiments and the sense of honorable obligation which 
characterize the judicial departments of civilized nations'. Ibid..p. 44. 
Comments by Elihu Root, S. Doc. No. 444 10-11, 1128, 1135 (60th Sess. 1907), reprinted in John Hay and 
Elihu Root, Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Conferences, 1899 and 1907 (World Peace Foundation 
Pamphlet Series, 1913), vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 20, 22-23. The Permanent Court of Arbitration had been 
established eight years earlier, in 1899, by the First Hague Peace Conference. See also Elihu Root, Instructions 
to the American Delegates to the Hague Conference, 1907, in James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 
and 1907 (1909), vol. 2, pp. 181, 191. 
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cited in another case. Such an arriere pensee might lead to disparaging or approving 
some legal authority or argument regularly presented in similar disputes,54 and 
thus intended to persuade in a different matter where the arbitrator's firm acts as 
counsel. 
The flip-side of the coin might also present itself, with an arbitrator influenced 
by his or her position while acting as counsel in another case. This difficulty was 
encountered in a treaty-based investment proceeding heard in the Netherlands, 
where a Dutch court gave an individual 10 days to decide whether to resign as 
arbitrator or as counsel.55 The judicial reasoning rested on the specific facts of the 
case at bar, and created no automatic presumption of bias simply because the same 
individual might serve as arbitrator in one case and counsel in another. 
Other wrinkles on this theme come from the world of sports. In one recent case, 
the cyclist Floyd Landis challenged an arbitral award upholding a doping 
disqualification for use of synthetic testosterone in the 2006 Tour de France. The 
Lausanne-based Court of Arbitration for Sport/Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (CAS/ 
TAS) had convened the arbitral tribunal to review a ban imposed by the US 
Anti-Doping Agency.56 
In September 2008, Landis moved to challenge the decision in a US federal 
court in California, contending that the arbitral tribunal had been tainted by 
conflicts of interest.57 The gist of the argument seems to be that the arbitrators 
came from a limited pool that often filled rotating functions between arbitrator 
and advocate, allegedly prone to rule favourably for each other.58 
For example, investor-state cases routinely implicate the shareholders' right to bring derivative claims on 
behalf of corporations in which they own stock. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain, 
Second Phase) [1970] ICJ 3 (5 February), available at 1970 WL 1 (IGJ). 
See A. Marriott, 'The Arbitrator is Counsel' in Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt (December 2006), available at 
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/ (subscription required). The well-known French jurist 
Emmanuel Gaillard, sitting as arbitrator in a case pitting Telekom Malaysia against Ghana, had been 
advising an Italian construction consortium (RFCC) that sought to annul an earlier ICSID award rejecting 
claims against Morocco. On 18 October 2004, the Hague District Court reasoned that Emmanuel Gaillard, 
in his role as counsel in RFCC/Morocco, would advocate the invalidity of that award, on which Ghana relied 
for its defence in the Telekom Malaysia matter. As arbitrator, Gaillard would be required to remain open-
minded towards the validity of the earlier award. Gaillard chose to resign as counsel rather than as arbitrator. 
Ibid. 
The CAS/TAS panel was comprised of a multinational tribunal including David Williams, Jan Paulsson and 
David Rivkin. Landis v. US Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2007/A/1394 (Ct Arb. Sport 2008), available at www.tas-
cas.org/d2wffles/document/1418/5048/0/Award%20Final%20Landis%20(2008.06.30).pdf. 
Mr Landis filed a Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award in the US District Court for the Central District of 
California. The case was ultimately settled with prejudice on 4 December 2008. Landis moved to vacate on 
the basis of the Federal Arbitration Act, s. 10(a)(2) (evidential partiality or corruption) and New York 
Convention, Art. V(l)(a) (invalid arbitration agreement), (d) (improper composition of the tribunal) and (2)(b) 
(violation of public policy). Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and Demand for Jury Trial, Landis v. US 
Anti-Doping Agency, No. CV 08-06330 (CD. Cal. 25 September 2008). 
The motion alleges, 'these arbitrators constantly find themselves changing hats, arbitrator one day, litigant 
the next'. Ibid. 27. As illustration, the motion recites that David Rivkin presided over a CAS/TAS panel 
considering an action against Austrian skiers in which Mr Paulsson represented the IOC, with the result 
(according to the motion) that the arbitrator appointed by the Anti-Doping Agency (David Rivkin) was sitting 
in judgment of the arbitrator appointed by Mr Landis (Jan Paulsson). Ibid. 24. The motion also recites that 
David Rivkin represented an affiliate of Occidental Petroleum in an arbitration in which the same David 
Williams served as arbitrator. Ibid. 27. 
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The independence of the CAS/TAS itself has not always been free from doubt. 
In its early days, the CAS/TAS was challenged following a 1992 incident 
implicating a German equestrian whose horse had ingested a prohibited 
substance. A challenge to the ban was brought before Switzerland's highest court, 
the Tribunal federal in Lausanne, which was asked to determine whether the 
decision was in fact an arbitral award in the sense of the Swiss federal and cantonal 
statutory legal framework for arbitration.59 Although not denying the validity of 
the decision in the instant case, the Tribunal federal drew attention to the 
numerous then-existing links between the CAS/TAS and the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC), which could cause apprehension that the 
independence of the CAS/TAS would be weakened in the event the IOC stood 
before it as a party to proceedings.60 
In response to the hesitation expressed in this decision, a new supervisory body 
was created to insulate the CAS/TAS from the influence of the IOC.6 1 This new 
structure seems to have passed muster, at least in the eyes of the Tribunal federal.62 
(b) Institutional Bias and Professional Affiliation 
To some extent, concerns over issue conflict and role confusion intersect with what 
is sometimes called 'institutional bias'. A particular arbitral institution might be 
perceived as tending to appoint arbitrators likely to favour one category of litigants 
over others. For example, in a consumer debt action, arbitrators with long 
affiliations to banks and lending institutions might not inspire confidence in 
borrowers. Or, in a dispute over mismanagement of an investment account, an 
arbitrator who worked for a large financial institution might create an 
understandable apprehension of being predisposed to favour the brokerage 
house.63 
A somewhat related charge is made that arbitrators may have incentives to 
decide in favour of claimants in order to increase their prospects of reappointment. 
Elmar Gundelv. Federation intemationak d'eguitation, Recueil Officiel Tribunal federal Suisse, 15 March 1993, 119 
Recueil Officiel des Arrets du Tribunal federal [ATF] II 271 (Switz.), extract reprinted in (1986-1998) 
Recueil des sentences du TAS Digest of CAS Awards 561 (Matthieu Reeb (ed.), 1998); see Jan Paulsson, 'The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal Recognises the Finality of Arbitral Awards relating to Sports Disciplinary Sanctions 
Rendered by the IOC's Court of Arbitration for Sports' in Int'lArb. Rep. (October 1993), p. 12. 
One scholar described this decision as 'oui, mais' ('yes, but'). Antonio Rigozzi, L'arbitrage international en matiere 
de sport s. 523 (2005), p. 274. 
The entity is called the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) in English and Conseil 
international pour l'arbitrage en matiere de sport (CIAS) in French. For the operation of the ICAS/CIAS, 
see generally, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitration at the Olympics (2001). 
See e.g., Lazutina and Danilova v. IOC, FIS and CAS, Tribunal federal Suisse, 27 May 2003, 129 ATF III 445 
(Switz.) (concerning members of the Russian women's ski team). See also, commentary in Rigozzi, supra n. 60 
atss. 537-551, pp. 279-287. 
Ironically, the rise of consumer and employment arbitration within the United States derives in some 
measure from a mirror image concern over civil juries being predisposed toward the 'little guy' as represented 
by the customer or the worker. For expressions of concern from someone who questions the tradition of 
'mandatory' arbitration in the United States, see]eaxi R. Sternlight, 'Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking 
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration' in (1996) 74 Wash. ULQ_ 637, and Jean R. 
Sternlight, 'In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company)' in (2007) 8 JVev. 
LJ 82. 
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For example, one author suggests that 'as merchants of adjudicative services, 
arbitrators have a financial stake in furthering [arbitration's] appeal to claimants', 
which results in an 'apprehension of bias in favour of allowing claims and awarding 
damages against governments'.64 
Of course, individuals who supplement their incomes as arbitrators are not 
immune from temptations to greed and bias to which humanity has always been 
heir. Each arbitrator should be conscious of the risk that he or she may fall prey to 
astigmatic perspectives. The beginning of wisdom often lies in a healthy fear of 
latent bias. 
Nevertheless, no evidence supports the proposition that the arbitral system as it 
now exists provides incentives to produce inaccurate decisions that favour either 
claimants or respondents, or even that such incentives actually exist. Common 
sense tells us that the big losers would be none other than professional arbitrators 
themselves if the process did not inspire general confidence. Although concern 
may be justified against certain types of arbitration, broad theories of 'arbitrator 
incentives' remain difficult to support in logic or in practice, particularly for 
cross-border transactions where the principal motivation to arbitrate lies in 
apprehension about potential antiforeign prejudice in national courts.65 
Where necessary, dispute resolution systems can implement mechanisms to 
promote the balanced composition of a tribunal.66 For example, US securities 
arbitration has understandably been concerned that the majority of a three-
member tribunal should not be drawn from the ranks of lawyers who make their 
living representing financial advisers. Consequendy, it has long been the practice 
to identify 'public' as opposed to 'industry' arbitrators, and to make sure that the 
latter do not predominate in any arbitral tribunal.67 Analogous issues arise in 
Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007), pp. 152—153. Van Harten then goes on to 
state his view that arbitrators do not satisfy the requisite standard of 'independence'. Ibid. 
One study found evidence that in federal civil actions in the United States, foreigners actually fare better than 
domestic parties. The explanation for this counter-intuitive finding may well lie in the fear of litigation bias 
that causes foreigners to continue to final judgment only if they have particularly strong cases. See Kevin 
Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, 'Xenophilia in American Courts' in (1996) 109 Haw. L Rev. 1120. 
In response to a lawsuit brought by the Minnesota Attorney General, at least one provider of arbitration 
services recentiy decided not to supervise consumer arbitration. See Minnesota Attorney General, Press 
Release, 'National arbitration forum barred from credit card and consumer arbitrations under agreement 
with Attorney General Swanson', 20 July 2009, available at www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/ 
090720National ArbitrationAgremnt.asp. The complaint asserted that the arbitral institution had 
impermissible links with debt collection services. Ibid. 
In the United States, many of these cases fall to be decided under the auspices of the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory body that in 2007 consolidated the dispute resolution for 
both the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange. FINRA 
(NASD) Rules, rule 12402 provides in pertinent part: 'If the panel consists of one arbitrator, the arbitrator 
will be a public arbitrator selected from the public chairperson roster, unless the parties agree in writing 
otherwise. If the panel consists of three arbitrators, one will be a non-public arbitrator and two will be public 
arbitrators, one of whom will be selected from the public chairperson roster, unless the parties agree in 
writing otherwise'. FINRA Rules (2008), rule 12402, available at http://finra. complinet.com/finra/ (search 
for rule number in search box). On 9June 2008, FINRA amended the definition of a 'public' arbitrator under 
NASD Rules, rules 12100(u) and 13100(u), as set forth in the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer 
Disputes and the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes. The amendment adds an annual 
revenue limitation to the definition of'public' arbitrator in order to exclude from that category of individuals 
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employment arbitration, although the ways to assuage the concern are not yet that 
clearly identified.68 
(c) Repeat Players 
Another critique of arbitration that dovetails into those mentioned above arises 
with respect to so-called 'repeat players' who might be appointed several times by 
the same party or law firm. Although some professional guidelines address the 
matter,69 greater clarity might well be in order.70 
The notion of'repeat player' has a somewhat chameleon-like character that may 
lead to confusion. One concern relates to individuals who change functions in the 
arbitral process, serving one day as advocate and another as arbitrator, thus 
arguably sitting in judgment of each other's clients.71 Another relates to 
individuals appointed on several occasions by the same company or industry 
group. For example, in disputes between insurance companies and policyholders, 
a barrister with a long history of acting on behalf of insurers might regularly be 
named by insurers. These special situations remain quite distinct from the 
understandable practice by which experienced individuals serve regularly in 
commercial and investment disputes, sometimes nominated by claimant, 
sometimes by respondent, and sometimes as chair. 
Much can be said on behalf of the 'professional arbitrator' who serves 
repeatedly, albeit in different types of cases. There may be some truth to the 
oft-repeated assertion that arbitrators want to see cases decided in favour of the 
parties which appointed them. 
Usually, however, an even stronger incentive exists to safeguard professional 
status, particularly with peers. Individuals who serve as arbitrators care deeply 
about the respect of their colleagues, for reasons both personal and professional. 
Doing a good job builds a positive reputation. Few enticements to good behaviour 
with a direct or indirect connection to the securities industry. For example, lawyers or accountants seeking to 
preside over FINRA arbitration disputes may not derive 10 per cent or more of their annual revenue from 
financial institutions, or devote 20 per cent or more of their work to clients who are brokers or dealers. Ibid. 
rules 12100(u), 13100(u). 
See e.g., Cole v. Bums International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), in which Chief Judge Harry 
Edwards understandably held that an employee alleging discrimination cannot be subject to a de facto bar in 
the vindication of statutory rights by virtue of inability to pay the arbitrator's fee. However, the employer's 
payment of arbitrators' fees may itself raise other concerns. Mindful of the proverb that 'he who pays the 
piper calls the tune', some observers wonder whether an arbitral process does not become distorted if one 
industry group covers all of the costs. See also, the discussion of arbitrator neutrality in Armendariz v. Foundation 
Health Psychare Services, 6 P.3d 669, 693 (Cal. 2000), another case concerning arbitration with respect to 
contracts of employment. 
The IBA Guidelines include the 'Orange List' of situations that may, depending on the facts of the case, give 
rise to 'justifiable doubts' about an arbitrator's independence or impartiality. IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at 
Pt II, s. 3.13. That provision describes an arbitrator who 'has within the past three years been appointed as 
arbitrator on two or more occasions by one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties'. Ibid. 
See generally, Fatima-Zahra Slaoui, 'The Rising Issue of "Repeat Arbitrators": A Call for Clarification' in 
(2009) 25 Arb. Int'l 103. 
See discussion supra of Floyd Landis v. US Anti-Doping. 
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are stronger for those who sit regularly as arbitrators than a colleague's 
appreciation of one's ability and integrity.72 
(d) Duty to Investigate 
Among the new frontiers being addressed by judicial decisions, few are more 
intellectually challenging than the matter of an arbitrator's duty to investigate. It 
has long been common coin of conflicts analysis that arbitrators must disclose 
significant relationships that might call into question their independence. What 
happens, however, when the arbitrator knows of no relevant relationships? Must 
he or she go one step further and investigate possible conflicts? Must arbitrators 
actively look for trouble? 
The answer, perhaps unsatisfying to those who seek hard and fast rules, must be 
'sometimes'. In a recent US case, an appellate court stopped short of imposing a 
general duty to investigate, limiting its holding to situations in which the arbitrator 
had reason to believe that some conflict might exist.73 The case confirmed vacatur 
of a commercial award for 'evident partiality' (the relevant standard under the 
Federal Arbitration Act) because the challenged arbitrator had failed to investigate 
possible business transactions that might have affected his independence.74 
The facts of the case merit close scrutiny. A dispute between a Turkish company 
and an American corporation led to arbitration in which the presiding arbitrator 
learned of a potential conflict that was disclosed by email, with no objection by 
either side.75 After the arbitral tribunal determined liability in favour of the 
American party, the proceedings continued into the damages phase. It was then 
discovered that the challenged arbitrator's company had been involved in a 
relatively small transaction (approximately US$275,000) with the entity that 
acquired the American party. On the arbitrator's refusal to recuse himself, the 
Turkish side brought an action to vacate the award on liability. The tribunal 
chairman was president and CEO of what the reviewing court described as 'a 
multi-billion dollar company with 50 offices in 30 countries'.76 An affiliate of that 
group apparently had a relatively small business transaction with a company 
related to the American side. The chairman had earlier informed the parties of the 
negotiations with that entity, but did not reveal that at a later time a contract had 
been actually concluded. The court was not impressed by the arbitrator's 
explanation that a 'Chinese Wall' had been erected between himself and the 
potential conflict.77 
72
 On the general comportment of who might be sometimes called elite arbitrators, see Jan Paulsson, 'Ethics, 
Elitism, Eligibility' in (1997) J Int'lArb. (December) 13. On the profiles of those chosen to serve as arbitrators 
in international disputes, see Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial 
Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (1996). 
73
 See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, AS, 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007). 
74
 Ibid. 136, 139. 
75
 Ibid. 134-135. 
76
 Ibid. 135. 
77
 Ibid. 138-139. 
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The appellate decision noted that the lower court had cited both the American 
Arbitration Association/American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators 
in Commercial Disputes (AAA/ABA Code of Ethics) and the IBA Guidelines.78 To 
the thoughtful observer, this provides an illustration of the trend towards cross-
pollination of ethical standards in international arbitration, with national courts 
looking to professional guidelines just as arbitral institutions look to judicial 
decisions. 
Analogies are not perfect, of course, which is why they are simply analogies. 
Judges might look to professional guidelines as a way to measure arbitrators with 
their own ruler. And arbitral institutions might look to judicially created rules as 
benchmarks that will be applied by reviewing courts. In either instance, however, 
the result will be a convergence of standards. 
IV. C H A L L E N G E S I N I N V E S T O R - S T A T E A R B I T R A T I O N 
(a) The Paradigm Shift 
Students of history remember that claims related to mistreatment of a foreign 
investor traditionally were subject either to the home court jurisdiction of the 
expropriating country or to the 'gunboat diplomacy' of the investor state's political 
and military influence.79 In some instances, arbitration triggered by diplomatic 
pressure led to significant and controversial debates on legal theories about state 
responsibility.80 
In its early days, investor-state arbitration was largely a matter of contract,81 
with concession agreements serving as the foundation for arbitrators' power to 
Ibid. 136. 
Although the legal use of force is now more circumscribed as a tool of foreign policy, see UN Charter, Art. 51, 
the reality of military influence on international economic relations has not disappeared. 
For example, the Tinoco case (named for General Federico Tinoco, a Costa Rican dictator who ruled between 
1917 and 1919 after overthrowing that country's legitimate government) led to the elaboration of the 'odious 
debt' doctrine, which was revived in the context of Iraqi commitments contracted during the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. An award by William Howard Taft (who served as both President of the United States and 
Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court) upheld state succession with respect to governmental commitments 
(loans to the Royal Bank of Canada) but suggested that illegitimate obligations of an illegitimate government 
may nevertheless fail to bind following the downfall of the illegitimate ruler. Tinoco (Great Britain v. Costa Rica) 
(1923) 1 R Int'l Arb. Awards 369, reprinted in \8Am.JInflL 147 (1924); see also, Lee C. Buchheit etal, 'The 
Dilemma of Odious Debts' in (2007) 56 Duke LJ 1201, 1261 (suggesting that as a putative doctrine of 
international law, had it flown at all, 'odious debts' would have flown very low, 'far beneath the level of 
near-universal consensus required to make it a binding norm of international law'); Tai-Heng Cheng, 
'Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine' in (2007) 70 Law and Contemp. Probs. 7; David C. Gray, 'Devilry, 
Complicity, and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debt' in (2007) 70 Law and Contemp. Probs. 137; 
Bradley N. Lewis, 'Restructuring the Odious Debt Exception' in (2007) 25 BU Int'l LJ 297; Odette Lienau, 
'Who is the "Sovereign" in Sovereign Debt?' in (2008) 33 Yale J Int'l L 63. The doctrine of odious debts [dettes 
odimses) was formalised in 1927 by a former minister of Tsarist Russia then teaching law in Paris. See 
Alexander N. Sack, Les effets des transformations des Etats sur leurs dettespubliques et autres obligationsfinanciires (1927) 
(Fr.). 
Not all investment arbitration was contractual, however. In 1794, the so-called Jay Treaty (named for its 
American negotiator John Jay) gave British creditors the right to arbitrate claims of alleged despoliation by 
American citizens and residents. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, United States—United 
Kingdom, 19November 1794,8Stat. 116. Under Art. 6, damages for British creditors were to be determined 
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hear investor claims for dejure or de facto expropriation.82 During the past several 
decades, however, bilateral and multilateral treaties have given foreign investors an 
opportunity to arbitrate disputes even in the absence of any direct concession with 
the host state.83 
The paradigm shift from contract to treaty, as the foundation for redress for 
expropriation and discrimination, means that arbitrator integrity has become even 
more vital to host state acceptance of investor claims that affect vital national 
interests such as the environment, taxation and administration of justice. Although 
consent remains the foundation of arbitral jurisdiction, government acceptance 
takes a blanket form through free trade and investment agreements, or even an 
investment statute. 
A treaty-based standing offer to arbitrate gives foreign investors a direct right of 
action against the host state, exercisable as the occasion arises,84 subject always to 
the conditions provided in the treaty or statute itself.85 In some instances, there 
may also be an opportunity for government-to-government arbitration following 
reimbursement to investors under political risk insurance. 
(b) Critiques of Arbitrator Integrity in Investor—State Cases 
Investor-state arbitration has been a fertile ground for criticism related to 
arbitrator integrity. Some authors have written of'the businessman's court' with 
the implication that arbitrators tend to favour claimant-investors in order to 
increase prospects of reappointment.86 A large part of the critique aims at the 
current 'party-selection' system, suggesting that arbitrators' desire for business 
by five commissioners, two appointed by the British and two by the United States. The fifth was to be chosen 
unanimously by the others, in default of which selection would be by lot from between candidates proposed 
by each side. See generally, Barton Legum, 'Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and thejay Treaty of 1794' 
in (2001) 18 News from ICSID 11. 
Often investor—state arbitration would take place pursuant to an investment concession between host country 
and foreign investor. See e.g., Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 
(D.D.C. 1980), vacated, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (unpublished table decision); Texaco Overseas Petrol. 
Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 389 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1978). Such investment 
arbitration pursuant to concessions is different, of course, from so-called mixed commissions of the colonial 
era. 
See generally, Campbell McLachlan et al, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (2007). 
Jan Paulsson has suggested the catchphrase 'arbitration without privity'. Jan Paulsson, 'Arbitration Without 
Privity'in (1995) 10 ICSID Rev.—Foreign Investment LJ 232. See generally, Alain Prujiner,'L' arbitrage unilateral: 
Un coucou dans le nid de l'arbitrage conventionel?' in (2005) Revue de L'Arbitrage 63. 
In one recently decided ICSID case, the tribunal rightly reminded us of the need for caution with respect to 
notions such as 'arbitration without privity'. Wintershall Aktimgesellschafl v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/ 
04/14 (2008) (Award). Fali S. Nariman presided, with Dr Santiago Torres Bernardez and Prof. Piero 
Bernardini as co-arbitrators. Finding that the facts of that case did not permit the investor to invoke a 'most 
favoured nation' clause (allowing an investor invoking one treaty to benefit from more favourable provisions 
of another), the tribunal stressed that consent in writing remains the cornerstone of ICSID arbitration. Ibid. 
para. 160. The treaty's standing offer to arbitrate must be accepted on a case-by-case basis. Lack of privity 
at the beginning does not dispense with the requirement to perfect the agreement to arbitrate. Perfection 
occurs when a particular investor accepts that standing offer by filing a claim, and at that time must comply 
with the requirements of the treaty. 
See e.g., Van Harten, supra n. 4 at pp. 175-184 (advocating a public law model with tenured judges for 
investor-state dispute resolution). 
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leads to a systemic bias in favour of investors. Such pessimistic appraisals of 
arbitrators usually find themselves linked to a more diffusely negative commentary 
on investor—state relations, asserting a perceived malaise with respect to the 
fairness of arbitration itself.87 Each of these two concerns will be addressed below. 
(i) Systemic bias in favour of investors 
One common argument posits that systemic 'incentives' push arbitrators to decide 
for investors. The argument seems to run as follows: arbitrators seek to promote 
growth of investor-state proceedings in order to get future appointments; efforts to 
promote arbitration translate into decisions that favour claimant-investors, 
particularly when the appointing authority is ICSID, a World Bank affiliate.88 For 
reasons discussed below, neither evidence nor logic supports the existence of such 
incentives or their operation in practice. 
As a preliminary matter, inducements to pro-investor bias remain counter-
intuitive. Reputations tarnished by deviation from duty do not bring 
reappointment, at least when both host state and investor have a role in the 
process. Assuming rational arbitrators seek to enhance income, biased decision-
making would be an odd way to do so, given that awards would be subject to 
review by either national courts (for lack of due process or violation of public 
policy) or before an ad hoc committee convened in connection with an ICSID 
proceeding.89 Thus, if arbitrator incentives operate at all in large international 
cases, they work to promote accuracy and honesty. 
Although teenage boys may hope to attract adolescent girls by showing 
themselves dangerous and daring, no similar rule works for judges or arbitrators. 
Rumours of prejudice and partiality do little to enhance the credibility of 
professional decision-makers, who normally benefit from reputations for reliability 
and accuracy. Bad arbitrators exist, but their lack of integrity does them no 
favours. 
Arbitral institutions will also want to obtain a reputation for even-handedness. 
In a world where treaties and contracts are freely negotiated, and multiple 
See Louis T. Wells and Rafiq Ahmed, Making Foreign Investment Safe (2007), pp. 283-298. The authors criticise 
investor-state arbitration for, inter alia, what they see as its rigidity and lack of sensitivity to changed 
circumstances and public policy, as well as the effect of moral hazard in the form of arbitration awards that 
discourage investor analysis of the stability of their contracts. They then suggest reforms including amiable 
composition (disregard of law and contract in favour of what is 'fair and just'), more transparency in 
arbitration, a common law that relies on precedent, and an appeals body to review awards. Ibid. p. 294. They 
then suggest that serious reforms will be resisted by 'the small group of lawyers who now dominate investment 
arbitration' in part because they resist 'making decisions based on criteria beyond the language of a contract' 
and fear smaller awards as 'a threat to their income'. Ibid. p. 298. Some of the conclusions will startle the 
thoughtful observer, particularly the suggestion that 'predictability of outcome' will follow the practice of 
looking 'beyond the language of a contract' and greater recourse to amiable composition. 
See Van Harten, supra n. 64 at pp. 152-153, 167-175. 
ICSID Convention, Art. 52 provides for award annulment when there was, inter alia, 'corruption on the part 
of a member of the Tribunal' or 'a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure'. ICSID 
Convention, Art. 52(c). Challenge to an arbitrator will be allowed as to individuals who do not meet the 
standards for Art. 14, which requires that an arbitrator 'may be relied upon to exercise independent 
judgment'. Ibid. Art. 14. 
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institutions compete for arbitration business, it would be self-destructive if any 
organisation gained a reputation for systematically turning out awards on behalf of 
either claimant or respondent. The disfavoured side would simply insist on using 
another forum. 
As a secondary matter, one might readily admit that a system of tenured 
international judges should be explored as a theoretically better system, as 
suggested in the 'public law' model advocated by Professor Van Harten.90 The 
difficulty, however, lies in finding a commercial appointing authority that would 
command worldwide confidence. The most realistic baseline against which to 
measure the present system is not a 'World Arbitrators Corps' appointed by a 
single universally admired institution, but rather a diffuse set of national courts 
staffed by judges perceived as even more partial (toward their appointing 
governments) than arbitrators constituted by a joint decision of the parties. 
A third and even more compelling reason exists to doubt the plausibility of a 
theory hypothesising pro-investor incentives. Without host state participation in 
bilateral (or multilateral) investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements 
(FTAs), investment arbitration would have little future. Just as it takes two to tango, 
so it takes two countries to conclude a treaty. Investor—state arbitration succeeds 
only if the process appears fair to host-state as well as investor interests. Host states 
appoint as many arbitrators as investors, and a presiding arbitrator must be 
acceptable to both sides. 
No 'Global Arbitral Authority' today commands general acceptance in the eyes 
of any sizeable number of economic players. In an international context, party 
input into the arbitrator selection process remains a condition for the litigants to 
feel comfortable with the legitimacy of the tribunal, and perhaps for acceptance of 
the treaty commitments in the first place. 
The present baseline against which to evaluate alleged arbitrator bias remains 
decision-making by judges beholden to national governments. It seems unrealistic 
to expect litigants to relinquish their traditional role in selecting arbitrators without 
a realistic alternative. Whilst ideals can be worth pursuing even if not fully 
realisable, the best would become the enemy of the good if pursuit of theoretical 
neutrality led to dismantling or dismissing the current system, which for all its 
faults suffers far less bias than its alternatives. 
Debates on the propriety of the current arbitrator selection system often touch 
on what is referred to as 'transparency', a notion that includes public pleadings and 
open hearings. On occasion, the more titillating term 'secrecy' is used to imply an 
aura of something untoward about arbitration, perhaps evoking the omerta or code 
of silence operating among criminal organisations in southern Italy. The 
assumption of such loaded language seems to be that secrecy is suspect, perhaps, 
because it breeds lack of accountability.91 In any event, it is not clear who benefits 
See Van Harten, supra n. 64 at pp. 175-184. Although the work of Prof. Van Harten criticises ICSID as an 
appointing authority, it does not seem to suggest any realistic replacement. 
See generally, 'Behind Closed Doors' in The Economist, 25 April 2009, p. 63 (reporting on the 'struggle' of an 
Indian lawyer named Ashok Sancheti who wished to receive publicity for his claim against the United 
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from lack of publicity.92 Host states themselves may resist the glare of publicity 
when an expropriation risks exposing political corruption or victimisation of 
ethnic groups through unfair spoliation. 
Assertions of systemic bias can detract attention from consideration of more 
concrete measures to promote arbitrator integrity. Thoughtful dialogue should 
focus on how to articulate and implement ethical principles that avoid the two 
principal paths by which arbitration may come into disrepute: (i) lax ethical canons 
that tolerate arbitrator prejudgment and hidden links to parties, and (ii) unrealistic 
rules that facilitate abusive arbitrator challenges designed to disrupt the arbitral 
process. 
Dialogue on arbitrator integrity becomes more plausible if linked to the way 
arbitrators consider facts and legal arguments. Do cases suggest that arbitrators 
invent treaty requirements not apparent on the face of the convention, in a way 
analogous to the way some American judges find 'penumbra' rights in the United 
States Constitution? Does bias show in weighing evidence or granting requests for 
document production? Have arbitrators shut their eyes to discriminatory rhetoric 
from host state legislators in parliamentary exchanges?93 
As mentioned earlier, institutional incentives to arbitrator bias can and do exist 
when arbitrators are taken from one particular industry.94 Analogies from 
domestic arbitration do not always transplant well, however. When disputes 
address a specific sector of the economy, arbitrators should not be closely identified 
with the relevant industry. By contrast, when the distinction lies between the two 
broad categories of host state and investors, few potential arbitrators of any 
experience or ability will be able to avoid association with one group or the other. 
Most will have links with both. 
Moreover, when the alleged enticements to bad behaviour relate to the simple 
dichotomy between investor and host state, the domestic paradigm loses much of 
its force. As illustrated by the role of sovereign wealth funds, countries such as 
China (traditionally considered a host state) often invest in countries such as the 
United States (the investor state par excellence). Needless to say, incentives to 
'repeat player' status can operate just as well for individuals known in the 
arbitration community to be regularly appointed by host states. 
Kingdom). For earlier debate on the subject, see also, Anthony De Palma, 'NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret' in 
NewYork Times, 11 March 2001, s. 3-1 (late edn). In December 2001, an advertisement in the Washington Post 
attacked investment arbitration under the headline 'Secret courts for corporations'. Sponsored by Ralph 
Nader's 'Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch', the publication referred to arbitrators as judges whose 
'identity[ies] can be kept secret indefinitely'. Washington Post, 5 December 2001, p. A-5. 
See Noah Rubins, 'Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, For Whose Benefit?' in 
Christian Klausegger et a/.(eds.), 2009 Austrian Arbitration Yearbook (2009), p. 483. 
Of course, smart people sometimes know how to mask their bias. This remains a fact of life no matter what 
the guiding principles on impartiality. Unless we establish a way to cut open an arbitrator's head to see what 
is really going on (and then put things back together again), the best clues to partiality lie in the things that 
actually have been said or written. 
Thus, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States has issued directives to limit the role of 
arbitrators with substantial connections to financial advisers. See supra n. 67 and accompanying text. The 
directives mandate that arbitrators who decide consumer disputes involving brokerage houses should not be 
drawn unduly from the ranks of stockbrokers or their lawyers. 
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(ii) Disillusionment with arbitration 
The suggestion that arbitrator bias is driven by systematic incentives will dovetail 
into the current debate about whether investor—state arbitration continues to 
inspire general confidence.95 The argument that public appreciation for 
investment arbitration has been dissipated rests on several factors, including 
increased political sensitivity and inconsistent results. Concern about arbitrator 
integrity constitutes one element in the mix of alleged malaise. 
As a preliminary matter, it is far from clear that fear of bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and academics. Even if 
international arbitration does not inspire universal confidence, it seems to 
command greater legitimacy than any reasonable alternative. The number of 
countries that have recently opted out of the system, such as Bolivia and 
Ecuador,96 remains small enough to count on the fingers of one hand. Albeit not 
without some hesitation, nations as well as investors seem to be sticking with 
arbitration as a way of levelling the playing field. Even in the realm of taxation, a 
most public domain, arbitration has gained ground.97 
In addition, no evidence supports the proposition that the arbitration system 
operates as an assembly line of decisions that favours the investor. Host states seem 
to win their share of cases,98 however a win might be measured.99 No reason exists 
to think that arbitrators decided these matters other than according to their 
See e.g., M. Sornarajah, 'The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration' in Catherine A. 
Rogers and Roger P. Alford (eds.), The Future of Investment Arbitration (2009), p. 273. 
See infra nn.104—105. The situation remains somewhat more nuanced in Venezuela, where a recent judicial 
decision seems to have acknowledged the validity of binding international arbitration under certain 
circumstances. See Ivor D. Mogolion-Rojas, 'Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal Restates ICSID Jurisdiction' in 
(2009) 10 Int'l Arb. QL Rev. 103 (discussing an interpretative decision of 17 October 2008, given by the 
Venezuelan Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal). 
Many income tax treaties now incorporate OECD proposals to integrate arbitration mechanisms into the 
so-called Mutual Agreement Procedure, which hitherto relied exclusively on negotiations among government 
officials with a stake in the outcome of the case. See Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD, 
2008), Art. 25(5). Such provisions have been incorporated in recent protocols of treaties that the United States 
has concluded with Belgium, Canada and Germany. See generally, William W. Park and David R. Tillinghast, 
Income Tax Treaty Arbitration (2004); Marcus Desax and Marc Veit, 'Arbitration of Tax Treaty Disputes: the 
OECD Proposal' in (2007) 23 Arb. Int'l 405. 
For a sample of decisions favouring host states, seeAguaytia Energy LLC v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/13 
(2008) (involving claim for alleged violation of a stabilization agreement); Metalpar SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/5 (2008) (turning on failure to establish breach of BIT protections); Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft 
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14 (2008) (finding of no jurisdiction by reason of inapplicability of 
BIT's 'most favored nation' clause to import procedural shortcut); Plama Consortium Ltd v. Bulgaria, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/24 (2008) (concluding that claimant was not entitled to protections under Energy Charter 
Treaty); MCI Power Group LCv. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6 (2007) (finding of no breach by Ecuador 
of obligations under power purchase arrangement, annulment decision is pending); Continental Casualty Co. v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 (2006) (dismissing most claims for asset 'pesification' on basis of United 
States-Argentina BIT; upholding duty to maintain public order; and surviving claim for US$ 112 million 
reduced to US$2.8 million plus interest); Consorzio Groupement LESI-DIPEKTA v. Algeria, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/8 (2005) (finding of no jurisdiction because claimant consortium possessed separate legal 
personality from constituent companies). The United States, as host country, prevailed against Canadian 
investors in the high-profile decisions of Mondev International, Ltd v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/ 
99/2 (2002); Laewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (2003), reprinted in (2003) 42 
ILM 811; and Methanex Corp. v. United States, 3 August 2005, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/arbitration/article-abstract/27/3/473/250636 by Boston U
niversity user on 05 D
ecem
ber 2019
Rectitude in International Arbitration 499 
particular substantive or jurisdictional merits. The cases show no propensity of 
arbitrators to rubber stamp investors' claims. Host states can be expected to win 
when the claimant's legal position is weak, and to lose when the evidence and law 
run the other way. Arbitrators are in fact capable of getting it right on the facts and 
the law. 
It bears noting that a rational investor would normally be expected to prefer 
national courts, given that arbitration implicates transaction costs in convening 
and funding a private tribunal whose decisions must be enforced through a 
complex network of treaties transcending multiple jurisdictions. These transaction 
costs seem to be outweighed by apprehension with respect to domestic courts of 
the country that allegedly has been discriminating against foreigners or 
expropriating their assets.100 
To some extent, both investment and commercial arbitration have become 
victims of their own success. Their general acceptance often makes them objects of 
criticism by observers who forget what led to arbitration in the first place: a 
genuine concern about politicised justice in national courts. Even if accepted for 
want of anything better, as a 'second best' solution, arbitration continues to provide 
what some have called 'enclaves of justice' for resolution of international economic 
MethanexFinalAward.pdf. In comparing interests of industrialised and non-industrialised countries, a fair-
minded observer would also note awards in favour of investors from developing countries, as in Desert Line 
Projects LLCv. Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17 (2008), in which 'moral damages' were awarded when an 
Omanian company charged with building roads was expelled from worksites at gun point by government-
sponsored gangs. See also, Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States (NAFTA claim under UNCITRAL Rules and 
administered by ICSID, June 2009), available at www.state.gov/s/1/c 10986.htm (dismissing Canadian 
mining company's claim arising from proposal to mine in California and finding federal and state regulations 
did not violate NAFTA); Empresa Elictrica del Ecuador, Inc. (EMELEC) v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9 
(2009) (dismissing a US$1.7 billion claim for lack of jurisdiction); 7X4 Spectrum deArg., SA v. Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/5 (2008) (a split tribunal rejecting a claim brought under the Netherlands-Argentina BIT 
after determining that claimant's ultimate owner was an Argentine citizen); FraportAG Frankfurt Airport Sews. 
Worldwide v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25 (2007) (dismissing German company's claim on 
jurisdictional grounds). 
Winning and losing implicate the amount of awards as well as findings of liability. If a US$100 million claim 
results in a US$1 million award, the claimant may not really feel that it prevailed. In this connection, see 
Susan Franck's study of more than 100 investment awards, finding that investors brought treaty claims for 
US$343 million on the average, but collected only US$10 million on the average. Susan D. Franck, 'An 
Empirical Analysis of Investment Treaty Awards' in (2007) 101 Am. Soc'y Int'l L Proc. 459; Susan D. Franck, 
'Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration' in (2007) 86 NCL Rev. 1, 49-50, 64; 
Susan D. Franck, 'Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution' in 
(2008) 48 Va. J Int'l L 767; Susan D. Franck, 'International Investment Arbitration: Winning, Losing and 
Why' in (2009) 7 Colum. FDI Persp. 1, available at http://vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/ 
SusanFranckPerspective-Final.pdf. In at least one case the claimant established liability but not damages. 
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (2008), para. 814. 
In evaluating the value of arbitration, much depends on the observer's perspective. Few Americans have 
trouble understanding why Ugandans of Indian origin, dispossessed by Idi Amin, might not have relished 
the prospect of seeking redress before courts in Kampala during the 1970s. Yet these same Americans might 
bridle at the offence to sovereignty when a Canadian asks for arbitration to repair loss occasioned by a 
xenophobic state jury. See e.g., Laewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (2003), 
reprinted in (2003) 42 ILM 811 (involving a US$500 million Mississippi verdict (later coupled with a 
US$625 million security requirement) against a Canadian funeral company for breach of agreements 
related to burial insurance, where the transactions giving rise to the lawsuit were valued at 1 per cent of the 
amount awarded). 
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controversies,101 serving as the best means to enhance the rule of law in a global 
marketplace lacking any omni-national courts or sheriffs. 
Although no one should belittle the need for vigilance with respect to bias in 
arbitration, a dialogue on the topic must be placed in context. Nations that are 
unhappy can revise existing models, as witnessed by the new paradigm that shows 
increased understanding of host states' positions, such as government veto of 
arbitration in tax matters102 and limits on arbitration claims based on general 
welfare legislation.103 
Moreover, host states can also walk away from the process entirely, as some have 
recently done. Bolivia denounced its adhesion to the ICSID Convention,104 and 
Ecuador's new constitution generally prohibits treaties or other international 
instruments that require arbitration in commercial disputes with private parties.105 
Most host states, however, have remained with the investor-state arbitration 
system. 
Critiques of arbitration tend toward a cyclical character, given that fashion 
invades the realm of ideas no less than the length for hemlines on ladies' dresses or 
the angle at which students tilt their caps. The recent actions of Bolivia and 
Ecuador echo the ideology of the 'new international economic order' of three 
decades earlier, which in turn took its cue from the 'Calvo doctrine' of the late 
nineteenth century.106 The doctrines of both attempted unsuccessfully to limit 
See Jan Paulsson, 'Enclaves of Justice' in Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt (September 2007), available at 
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/ (subscription required). A wholly separate debate, of course, 
surrounds whether investment treaties do in fact benefit developing nations. Many of the arguments in this 
connection have been summarised in the recent work of Prof. Susan Franck, evaluating both the arguments 
in favour of foreign investment and the scepticism expressed by scholars such as Profs Susan Rose-Ackerman 
and Jennifer Tobin. Susan D. Franck, 'Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the 
Rule of Law' in (2007) 19 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. and Den. LJ 337. See generally, Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa 
Sachs (eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (2009). 
See William W. Park, 'Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA's "Tax Veto'" in (2001) 2 Chi. J Int'IL 231; William 
W. Park, 'Arbitrability and Tax' in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis (eds.), Arbitrability: 
International and Comparative Perspectives (2008), p. 179, adapted from William W. Park, 'Tax, Arbitration and 
Investment Treaties' in Catherine A. Rogers and Roger P. Alford (eds.), The Future of Investment Arbitration 
(2009). 
The new US model for treaty-based investment arbitration clarifies the contours of substantive investor 
protection with respect to 'indirect' expropriation through regulatory actions that decrease the value of an 
investor's property, providing that governmental regulations will not normally constitute expropriation if 
non-discriminatory and designed to protect legitimate welfare objectives. US implementation of the new 
patterns began with the United States' free trade agreements with Singapore, Chile and Uruguay, as well as 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement. On the 2004 State Department model bilateral investment 
treaty, see e.g., David A. Gantz, 'The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions' in (2004) 19 Am. U Int'lL Rev. 
679; Mark Kantor, 'The New Draft Model U.S. BIT: Noteworthy Developments' in (2004) 21 J Int'lArb. 
383; Barton Legum, 'Lessons Learned from the NAFTA: the New Generation of U.S. Investment Treaty 
Arbitration Provisions' in (2004) 19 ICSID Rev.—Foreign Investment LJ 344. 
See generally, Emmanuel Gaillard, 'The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention', NYLJ, 26 June 2007, p. 1; 
Marco Tulio Montanes, 'Note, Bolivia Denounces ICSID Convention' in (2007) 46 ILM 969. 
.See Juan Manuel Marchan, 'The Treatment of Arbitration in the New Constitution of Ecuador' in (2008/ 
2009) News and Notes from Inst, for Transnat'l Arb. (Autumn/Winter) 1, 6-8 (discussing art. 422 of the 
Ecuadorian Constitution approved by referendum on 28 September 2008). In May 2009, President Correa 
of Ecuador announced again that his government is considering withdrawing from the ICSID system. 
The esteemed Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo argued that foreign investors in Latin America should submit 
expropriation disputes to local courts. Announced in 1868, the doctrine received fuller expression in his 
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investor—state arbitration, which at the time was a creature of contractual 
investment concessions.107 
The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States provided that any 
'controversy [about expropriation of foreign property] shall be settled under the 
domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals'.108 This approach was 
ultimately rejected in arbitration awards109 as well as by developing countries 
themselves when they came to see that the absence of an option for arbitration 
risked putting a chill on welfare-enhancing economic cooperation. The fact that 
such discredited ideologies again become trendy in certain academic and political 
circles does not mean they have merit.110 
Central to sound analysis is the fact that investor-state arbitration is a dynamic 
process based on informed negotiation. Unlike American credit card companies 
that impose arbitration clauses through fine print in a monthly statement, 
investment and free trade agreements are concluded under the glare of public 
scrutiny by governments that represent both capital-exporting and capital-
importing concerns. 
(c) Mechanics of Challenge: Basic Texts 
Challenges to arbitrators in investor—state disputes would normally be brought 
under either the ICSID Convention or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,111 
treatise on public international law, stating that foreign nations should not intervene in South America to 
protect private property and debts. Le droit international theorique et pratique (5th edn, 1896), vol. 1, ss. 185-205, 
pp. 322-351; ibid. vol. 3, ss. 1280-1296, pp. 142-155. The corollary was that claims for improper takings of 
property were to be brought by the foreign investors, and were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of host 
state law and courts. See K. Lipstein, 'The Place of the Calvo Clause in International Law' in (1945) 22 Brit. 
IS Inf IL 130; William W. Park, 'Legal Issues in the Third World's Economic Development' in (1981) 61 BU 
LRev. 1321. 
See generally, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281, UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp 
No. 31, UN Doc. A/9631 (12 December 1974); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, GA Res. 3201, UN GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, UN Doc. A/9559 (1 May 
1974). 
GA Res. 3281, art. 2(2)(c). The Charter was adopted by a vote of 120 to 6, with 10 abstentions. The six 
negative votes were cast by Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom and United States. Those abstaining were Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Spain. 
See Award on the Merits in Dispute between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. and 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1978) 17 ILM 1 ('TOPCO Award'). 
See generally, Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and William W. Park, 'The New Face of Investment Arbitration in 
(2003)28 Yale J Int'l 1365. 
Under some investment treaties, investors and host states may have the option to choose other arbitration 
regimes. In addition, arbitration might arise under the terms of a concession agreement containing its own 
arbitration clause. In some instances, arbitration claims have been filed on the same set of facts under both 
ICSID and ICC Rules. See S Pac. Prop., Ltd v. Egypt, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3 (1988). The 
ICC award was subject to extensive discussion in the French judicial actions that led to its vacatur. See Cour 
d'appel de Paris, 12 July 1984, translated in (1984) 23 ILM 1048; Cour de Cassation, 6 January 1987, 
translated in (1987) 26 ILM 1004. For the ICSID award of 20 May 1992, see (1995) 3 ICSID Rep. 189 at 
241. See also, W. Laurence Craig, 'The Final Chapter in the Pyramids Case: Discounting an ICSID Award 
for Annulment Risk' in (1993) 8 ICSID Bee.—Foreign Investment L.J. 264. 
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each of which provides the framework for private claims under BITs and FTAs.112 
Although these systems share some common elements, their treatment of 
challenges will diverge with respect to two key elements: the person who decides 
whether the challenge is justified, and the possibility of judicial review. On both 
matters, UNCITRAL arbitration falls toward the commercial arbitration 
model.113 
In ICSID arbitration, the touchstone will be the words in Article 14 of the 
ICSID Convention, which speak of the individual's ability to 'exercise independent 
judgment'.114 This requirement is supplemented by a certification of independence 
made by the arbitrator at the beginning of the proceedings.115 A party to the 
arbitration may propose disqualification of an arbitrator on account of any fact 
indicating a 'manifest' inability to meet that standard.116 
In theory at least, challenges might also arise under other institutional or ad hoc rules. For example, art. 
24(3) of the 2004 United States Model BIT provides that a claimant may submit a request for arbitration 
under the Rules of ICSID, the ICSID Additional Facility, UNCITRAL, or 'if the claimant and respondent 
agree, to any other arbitration institution or under any other arbitration rules'. US State Department, 
Treaty between the Government of the United States and the Government of [Country} concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2004), art. 24(3), available at www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/38710.pdf. The same language appears in Free Trade Agreements, e.g. Art. 11.16 
of the South Korea-United States FTA (pending ratification). Free Trade Agreement between the United 
States and the Republic of Korea, Art. 11.16, United States-South Korea, 30 June 2007, available at 
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/ free-trade-agreements/korus-fta. By contrast, Art. 1120 of NAFTA limits 
itself to the ICSID, the ICSID Additional Facility, and UNCITRAL. North American Free Trade 
Agreement, United States-Canada-Mexico, ch. 11, Art. 1120, 17 December 1992, (1993) 32 ILM 289. 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are not to be confused with the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration ('UNCITRAL Model Law'). Although the former entails procedural 
rules for handling an arbitration arising from a governing instrument that warrants application of the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the latter constitutes a matrix of what UNCITRAL deems to be a 'model' national 
arbitration statute. Both the UNCITRAL Rules and Model Law address arbitrator challenge, and 
unsurprisingly, display vast similarities. 
The full text of ICSID Convention, Art. 14(1) contains both ethical and professional components. The full 
text reads: 'Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral character and 
recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to 
exercise independent judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in the case 
of persons on the Panel of Arbitrators'. ICSID Convention, Art. 14(1). See generally, Audley Sheppard, 
Arbitrator Independence in ICSID Arbitration' in Christina Binder et al. (eds.), International Investment Law for 
the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009), pp. 131, 147-148. Reforms proposed by Mr 
Sheppard include, inter alia, (i) a change in the grounds for challenge from 'manifest' lack of independence to 
'justifiable doubts' as to independence and impartiality; and (ii) decisions on challenge are to be made by an 
independent ad hoc committee rather than the challenged arbitrator's colleagues on the tribunal. 
Rule 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules requires each arbitrator, prior or during the tribunal's first session, 
to sign a declaration affirming, inter alia, that the individual will 'judge fairly as between the parties, 
according to the applicable law' and attach a statement of past and present professional, business, and other 
relationships with the parties, as well as any other circumstance that might cause the arbitrator's reliability 
for independent judgment to be questioned by a party. In signing the declaration, the arbitrator assumes a 
continuing obligation to prompdy notify ICSID of any such relationship that subsequendy arises during the 
proceedings. ICSID Rules of Arbitration Procedure, rule 6(2), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
ICSID Convention, Art. 57, provides as follows: A party may propose to a Commission or Tribunal the 
disqualification of any of its members on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities 
required by paragraph (1) of Article 14. A party to arbitration proceedings may, in addition, propose the 
disqualification of an arbitrator on the ground that he was ineligible for appointment to the Tribunal under 
Section 2 of Chapter IV. 
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When a dissatisfied litigant contests an arbitrator's fitness in an ICSID 
proceeding, the remaining arbitrators normally determine whether the individual 
lacks the capacity to exercise independent judgment.117 Any review of the resulting 
award would be made by an ICSID-appointed panel rather than national judges 
who might conduct their own review of independence and impartiality.118 By 
contrast, outside ICSID, challenges to arbitrators in commercial arbitrations 
would initially be heard by the relevant supervisory institution and then again 
come before whatever national court is charged with considering motions to 
review awards. 
Challenge under the UNCITRAL Rules differs in procedural mechanics, 
notwithstanding a basic similarity in the standards themselves. Article 10 provides 
for challenge if circumstances give rise to 'justifiable doubts' about the arbitrator's 
impartiality or independence.119 Unless the other side agrees or the arbitrator 
withdraws voluntarily, the challenge decision will be made by the appropriate 
'appointing authority' that constituted (or would otherwise have constituted) the 
tribunal itself.120 
In UNCITRAL arbitration, as in ordinary commercial cases, the ultimate 
validity of any appointing authority decision will be subject to review by national 
courts under the appropriate arbitration statute or within the framework of the 
New York Convention.121 
See ibid. Art. 58. The challenged arbitrator would first be given the opportunity to 'furnish explanations'. If 
the challenge relates to a majority of the arbitral tribunal, or if the remaining two members are equally 
divided, the disqualification decision will be made by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council, 
a post filled ex officio by the President of the World Bank pursuant to Art. 5 of the ICSID Convention. See 
generally, Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), pp. 1202-1206. See also the 
procedure amplified in rule 9 of the Arbitration Rules adopted by the ICSID Administrative Council 
pursuant to Art. 6 of the ICSID Convention. ICSID Rules of Arbitration Procedure, rule 9, available at 
http://icsid.worldbanlc.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
ICSID Convention, Art. 52. The limited grounds for challenge do not include an arbitrator's lack of 
independent thinking. An award may be set aside for the following reasons: (1) improper constitution of the 
tribunal; (2) tribunal excess of authority; (3) corruption of a tribunal member; (4) serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure; or (5) failure of the award to state reasons. Ibid. Art. 52(1). This challenge is 
made not to national courts, but pursuant to an internal ICSID process triggered by a letter to the ICSID 
Secretary General. Review is conducted by an ad hoc committee of three persons with authority to annul 
the award in part or in total. If an award is annulled, either party may require that it be submitted to a new 
tribunal. 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, GA Res. 31/98, art. 10(1), UN 
Doc. A/31/17 (15 December 1976), available at www.adr. org/sp.asp?id=22091. A similar formulation 
exists in art. 12 of the UNCITAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, GA Res. 40/72, 
art. 12, UN Doc. A/40/17/Annex I and A/61/17/Annex I (21 June 1985) ('UNCITRAL Model Law'). 
The wording in art. 12 contains an unfortunate (albeit perhaps unavoidable) complexity with respect to who 
gets to decide arbitrator challenges, distinguishing between situations (i) 'when the initial appointment was 
made by an appointing authority' (situations in which /competent to hear the challenge lies with the same 
appointing authority); (ii) 'when the initial appointment was not made by an appointing authority' (in which 
case the challenge will be heard by a previously designated authority); and (iii) 'all other cases', whereby 'the 
decision on the challenge will be made . . . [by the] appointing authority as provided for in article 6' of the 
Rules, under which the Permanent Court of Arbitration serves by default as the entity to designate an 
appointing authority if the parties cannot agree. UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 11. 
See New York Convention. In some instances, the relevant treaty framework would be found in the 
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, commonly known as the 1975 
Panama Convention. See 9 USC ch. 3 (2006). Although similar in their basic structure, the two conventions 
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In some cases an arbitrator's challenge will take place under what might be seen 
as a hybrid process under the ICSID Additional Facility. In such instances, the 
arbitration will be supervised by ICSID, under procedures similar to those of 
conventional ICSID cases, but outside the framework of the Washington 
Convention. The rule for challenge remains the ability to 'exercise independent 
judgment',122 and the decision will normally be made by the challenged 
arbitrator's remaining colleagues.123 However, national courts might also have 
their say on the matter when asked to vacate an award pursuant to their own 
standards of arbitrator fitness.124 
(d) Filling the Gaps 
(i) Effect of institutional rules and case law 
Implementation of ICSID and UNCITRAL challenge standards would be a very 
difficult job indeed if investor—state cases were isolated from lessons learned in 
other varieties of arbitration. Notions such as ability 'to exercise independent 
judgment'125 or 'justifiable doubts' as to impartiality or independence126 touch on 
notions of proper behaviour shared with other arbitral systems. 
In examining a motion to disqualify an arbitrator in an investor-state case, the 
decisions in analogous commercial arbitrations will inevitably have some 
influence. Consideration will be given to how things have been done pursuant to 
institutional rules, national statutes, other multilateral treaties (such as the New 
York Convention) and the 'soft law' of professional guidelines. These different 
differ in significant respects. For example, the Panama Convention does not require judges to refer parties 
to arbitration, or set forth conditions that must be satisfied by the party seeking award enforcement. 
Moreover, only the Panama Convention contains reference to arbitration rules (those of the Inter-American 
Commercial Arbitration Commission) that apply in default of party choice. See generally, Albert Jan van den 
Berg, 'The New York Convention 1958 and Panama Convention 1975: Redundancy or Compatibility?' in 
(1989) 5 Arb. Int'l 214;John Bowman, 'The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act' in (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 1. 
Rules governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID/11, Sch. C, art. 8 (10 April 2006), 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf ('ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules'). 
Ibid. art. 15(5) ('Disqualification of Arbitrators'). 
The Additional Facility Rules might apply in disputes where ICSID jurisdiction would not otherwise exist 
because either the host state or the investor's state is not party to the Washington Convention. For example, 
in the Metalclad case, an American company filed an Additional Facility Claim related to a hazardous waste 
disposal facility in Mexico. The arbitrators found that Mexican regulatory action denied 'fair and equitable 
treatment' and constituted expropriation without adequate compensation. Mexico petitioned to have the 
award set aside by the British Columbia Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction by virtue of the 
arbitration's official situs fixed in Vancouver notwithstanding that for convenience hearings had been held 
in Washington. The court found that some but not all of the arbitrators' conclusions exceeded their 
jurisdiction. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/l (2000) (Award), 
reprinted in (2001) 16 Int'l Arb. Rep. 62. 
ICSID Convention, Art. 14(1); ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Sch. C, art. 8. 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 10(1); see also, UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 12(2) ('An arbitrator may be 
challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or 
independence, or if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties'). 
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arbitration standards often follow roughly similar paths, albeit with different 
emphasis or minor variation. 
For example, the ICC Rules speak of arbitrator independence, but not 
impartiality.127 By contrast, impartiality as well as independence has been 
explicitly addressed in the UNCITRAL Rules,128 the UNCITRAL Model Law,129 
the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics,130 the IBA Guidelines131 and the LCIA Rules.132 
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law and other statutes that follow its paradigm, 
arbitrator bias as a ground for award vacatur seems to be subsumed under the 
general rubric of'public policy' violation.133 The IBA Guidelines mention 'actual 
bias' as a ground for declining appointment.134 
Most standards require an arbitrator's disclosure of circumstances that may 
cause doubts as to his or her ability to serve impartially and independently during 
a proceeding.135 Some make reference to 'justifiable' doubts,136 while others direct 
the arbitrator to ask whether the questionable circumstances would cause doubt 'in 
the eyes of the parties'.137 The IBA Guidelines include both 'justifiable doubts' 
and doubts 'in the eyes of the parties' as factors for an arbitrator to consider.138 
Some rules address arbitrator nationality. When litigants are of different 
nationalities, the LCIA Rules139 and the ICSID Convention140 generally provide 
that an arbitrator may not have the same nationality as either party. Conversely, 
the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that 'no person shall be precluded by reason 
of his nationality from acting as an arbitrator', unless the parties agree 
otherwise.141 The ICC Rules direct the ICC Court to consider an arbitrator's 
nationality in some circumstances.142 
In arbitration outside the treaty-based investor-state context, a decision on 
challenge for alleged conflict will often need to be made on the basis of both 
arbitration rules and applicable statute. Imagine, for example, arbitration 
conducted in England under the rules of the LCIA. One side complains that the 
arbitrator has prejudged some vital question by statements made in a procedural 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
/CC Rules, art. 9(2). 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 10. 
UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 12. 
AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 18 at Canon II. 
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard (1). 
London Court of International Arbitration Rules (1998), arts. 5.2, 10.3 ('LCIA Rules'). 
UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 34(2)(b)(ii). 
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at Explanation to General Standard 2. 
See AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 18 at Canon 11(A)(2); IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard 
2; ICC Rules, art. 7; ICSID Rules of Arbitration Procedure, rule 6(2); LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 5.3; 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 9. For discussion of a particularly problematic set of standards, see M. 
Scott Donahey, 'California and Arbitrator Failure to Disclose' in (2007) 1\JInt'lArb. 389. 
See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 9; LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 10.3. 
See ICC Rules, art. 7(2). 
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standards 2 and 3, in particular General Standards 2(c), 2(d) and 
Explanation to General Standard 3(a). 
LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 6.1. 
ICSID Convention, art. 39. 
UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 11(1). 
/CC Rules, art. 9(1). 
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order. The challenging party would begin by citing article 10.3 of the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules permitting challenge on the basis of circumstances 'that give rise 
to justifiable doubts as to [the arbitrator's] impartiality or independence'.143 There 
might also be a citation to article 10.2 of the LCIA Rules, which makes reference 
to an arbitrator who 'does not act fairly and impartially as between the parties'.144 
If the institutional challenge before the LCIA fails,145 the unhappy litigant might 
also bring a court challenge under English statute for 'justifiable doubts'146 as to 
the arbitrator's impartiality, or an application to annul the award itself for 'serious 
irregularity',147 including failure to '[a]ct fairly and impartially' as between the 
parties.148 
(ii) Specificity of investment cases 
Assertions about the uniqueness of investor-state cases often overstate the 
proposition.149 A clear cross-pollination of national and professional ethical 
standards exists as between commercial and investor-state cases. In reality, 
investor-state arbitration holds no monopoly on the 'private judging' that affects 
societal and economic wellbeing.150 Ethical standards in commercial cases fertilise 
decisions in investment cases, and vice versa. 
143
 LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 10.3. 
144
 Ibid. art. 10.2. 
145
 Under LCIA Rules, challenges are heard by a Division of the LCIA Court itself, usually pursuant to written 
memorials and on occasion (albeit rarely) with oral argument. Unlike many other arbitral institutions, the 
LCIA publishes a sanitised version of challenge decisions to guide future litigants with respect to 
nominations or challenges. See Geoff Nicholas and Constantine Partasides, 'LCIA Court Decisions on 
Challenges to Arbitrators: A Proposal to Publish, Annex: Survey of Exiting LCIA Challenge Decisions 2007' 
in (2007) 23 Arb. Ml 1 at pp. 2 1 ^ 1 . 
146
 Arbitration Act 1996, s. 24(1) (Eng.). 
147
 Ibid. s. 68. 
Ibid. s. 33. For an illustration under the ICC Rules, see discussion of challenge in AT&TCorp. v. Saudi Cable 
Co. [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127 (CA) (Eng.), available at 2000 WL 571190. In light of the fact that the 
arbitration began in 1995, the application to set aside partial awards invoked s. 23 of the 1950 Arbitration 
Act (not the 1996 Act) that speaks of arbitrator 'misconduct'. Ibid. 136-137. 
One recent essay suggested that commercial arbitration was conducted 'entirely by and for professionals'. 
Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and W. Michael Reisman, 'How Well are Investment Awards Reasoned?' in 
Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and W. Michael Reisman (eds.), The Reasons Requirement in International Investment 
Arbitration: Critical Case Studies (2008), pp. 1, 2. If this were true, of course, professors who teach about policy 
aspects of business disputes should be exposed as charlatans, and large portions of their scholarly work 
eliminated as meaningless. Decisions like Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985), which address safeguards involving antitrust claims, could be removed from national arbitration law, 
along with cases interpreting the language of New York Convention, Art. V(2)(b) on public policy violations. 
Surprisingly, the authors also suggest that international commercial awards are 'rarely published', 
notwithstanding the extensive collections of awards published in places such as the ICC Recueil des 
Sentences, Mealey's International Arbitration Reports, Journal de droit international, ASA Bulletin and 
Revue de l'arbitrage. 
For an exploration of the arguments on both sides, see Stephan Wilske et al, 'International Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and International Commercial Arbitration: Conceptual Difference or Only a "Status Thing"?' 
in (2008) 1 Contemp. Asia Arb. J 213. 
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Nor are the public effects of commercial arbitration any less real than those of 
treaty-based investor-state cases.151 If the financial crisis of 2008 demonstrates 
anything, it teaches that private choices have public consequences. Contract 
disputes affect the world's aggregate social and economic welfare no less than 
treaty controversies,152 and breaches of international law end up being decided in 
commercial arbitration just as in treaty-based proceedings.153 
(e) Transnational Standards and 'Soft Law' 
Increasingly, conflicts of interest implicate non-governmental instruments such as 
the professional standards issued by the International Bar Association or the 
American Arbitration Association. To some extent such guidelines will be 
supplemented by the writings of scholars and practitioners setting forth what 
might be termed the 'lore' of international arbitral procedure.154 
The use of the term 'soft law' to designate such guidelines has led to unfortunate 
misinterpretation and misapprehension. Some observers express concern that non-
governmental instruments will undermine the reasonable measure of certainty 
sought by merchants and investors to guide decision-making. The right critique 
has been aimed at the wrong target.155 
When properly applied, such standards can enhance certainty by providing an 
alternative to ad hoc rule-making by jurists whose facile eloquence may articulate 
One unfortunate effect of BIT-arbitration puffery lies in its tendency to reinforce stereotypes of investor-
state arbitration as so extraordinary as to be somehow illegitimate. A better course might be to acknowledge 
that all international arbitration is designed to enhance procedural and political neutrality by granting 
decision-making power to persons other than the national bodies with a stake in the outcome. 
For example, insurance arbitrators play a vital role in maintaining respect for the sanctity of contract, which 
in turn permits manufacturers to meet otherwise disruptive risks. Gas price revision arbitration affects how 
much people pay for heat in the winter. And arbitration of pharmaceutical licence disputes can have an 
impact on the price of drugs. 
See e.g., the LIAMCO arbitration with respect to the Libyan expropriation of US assets, discussed in Libyan 
American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F.Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated, 684 F2d 
1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (unpublished table decision). See also, TOPCO Award, supra n. 109. 
See e.g., Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, 'Major Criteria for International Arbitrators in Shaping an Efficient 
Procedure' in Arbitration in the Next Decade (ICC Int'l Ct Arb. Bull. Spec. Supp. 1999), p. 49; Jack J. Coe, Jr, 
'Pre-Hearing Techniques to Promote Speed and Cost-Effectiveness: Some Thoughts Concerning Arbitral 
Process Design' in (2002) 2 Pepp. Disp. Resol. LJ53; Paul Friedland, 'Combining Civil Law and Common Law 
Elements in the Presentation of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration' in (1997) Int'l Arb. Rep. 
(September) 25; Howard M. Holtzmann, 'Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility in International 
Arbitration Procedure' in Richard B. Lillich and Charles N. Brower (eds.), International Arbitration in the 21st 
Century (1993), p. 3; Mark Huleatt-James and Robert Hunter, 'The Laws and Rules Applicable to Evidence 
in International Arbitration Procedure and Some Issues Relating to Their Determination and Application' 
in Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell (ed.), The Commercial Way to Justice (1997), p. 45; Martin Hunter, 'Modern 
Trends in the Presentation of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration' in (1992) 3 Am. Rev. Int'l 
Arb. 204; Julian D.M. Lew and Laurence Shore, 'Harmonizing Cultural Differences in International 
Commercial Arbitration' in (1999) Disp. Resol. J (August) 32; Andreas F Lowenfeld, 'The Two-Way Mirror: 
International Arbitration as Comparative Procedure' in (1985) 7 Mich. YB Int'l Legal Stud. 163; James J. 
Myers, 'Ten Techniques for Managing Arbitration Hearings' in (1996) Disp. Resol. J (January-March) 28; 
Lucy Reed and Jonathan Sutcliffe, 'The "Americanization" of International Arbitration?' in (2001) Int'l Arb. 
Rep. (April) 37; John Uff, 'The Bill Tompkins Memorial Lecture 1994' in (1995) 61 Arbitration 18. 
See W. Michael Reisman, 'Soft Law Instruments Should have No Place in International Arbitration', paper 
delivered at the Institute for Transnational Arbitration Academy Council and American Society of 
International Law, Soft Law Symposium, 9 April 2008, Washington D.C. 
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'general legal principles' that constitute little more than a figleaf covering personal 
preferences.156 If crafted with intelligence, professional guidelines present a better 
guess about the parties' shared ex ante expectations than the unbridled discretion of 
overly clever arbitrators who pursue their own agendas.157 
Soft law instruments thus represent one check on the imperial decision-maker, 
and perhaps the only standard that can permit elaboration of procedural law 
through what John Rawls called the 'veil of ignorance' about the contingencies of 
a rule's application.158 Arbitrators who interpret preexisting norms have less 
leeway to pick rules that will lead to the outcome favoured by their subjective 
predispositions.159 
Ethical soft law forms part of a more general phenomenon by which standards 
elaborated by professional associations serve to guide arbitral decision-making in 
matters related to evidence160 and case management.161 Built on arbitral lore 
memorialised in articles, treatises and learned papers, these guidelines represent 
what might be called the 'soft law' of arbitral procedure, in distinction to the firmer 
norms imposed by statutes and treaties.162 Nothing prevents parties from agreeing 
to override the guidelines, which enter the arbitration only when such agreement 
proves impossible. 
William W. Park, 'National Law and Commercial Justice' in (1989) 63 Tul. L Rev. 647; William W. Park, 
Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation, 12 J. Int'l Arb. 99 (1995); William W. Park, 'Why 
Courts Review Arbitral Awards' in Robert Briner et al. (eds.), Recht der Intemationalen Wirtschqft und 
Streiterledigung im 21. Jahrhundert: Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz, Bockstiegel (2001), p. 595. 
William W. Park, 'Arbitration's Protean Nature: the Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion' in (2003) 19 
Arb. Int'l 279; William W. Park, 'Private Disputes and the Public Good' in (2005) 20 Am. UInt'l L Rev. 903; 
William W. Park, 'Procedural Default Rules Revisited' in Julian D.M. Lew and Loukas A. Mistelis (eds.), 
Arbitration Insights (2007), p. 360; William W. Park, 'The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration' in 
Loukas A Mistelis and Julian D.M. Lew (eds.), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (2006), p. 141. 
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), para. 24, p. 136. Rawls affirmed, inter alia, that to be just, rules 
should be uninformed by any existing litigation strategy, not created in function of what some might call the 
'ouch test', which looks to see who gets hurt by a particular rule. On some matters the 'veil of ignorance' 
already finds limited recognition in arbitration. For example, although different methods exist to calculate 
arbitrators' fees (ICC looks to the amount in dispute, while AAA and LCIA base fees on time spent), no 
institution gives an arbitrator discretion to opt for one approach or the other (ad valorem or hourly) after 
seeing how the case develops. 
Similar principles obtain with respect to the substantive law applied to the merits of the dispute, where most 
business managers seek predictability in normal commercial relations. As the late Dr Francis Mann noted, 
'no merchant of any experience would ever be prepared to submit to the unforeseeable consequences which 
arise from application of undefined and undefmable standards described as rules of a lex of unknown origin'. 
F.A. Mann, 'Introduction II to Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration' (Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed.), 1990), 
pp. xix, xxi. 
See IBA Working Party, 'Commentary on the New IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial 
Arbitration' in (2000) 2 Bus. L Int'l 16 at p. 17; see also, Michael Btihler and Carroll Dorgan, 'Witness 
Testimony Pursuant to the IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration: Novel or Tested 
Standards?' in (2000) 17 J Int'l Arb. 3. The rules are available at www.ibanet.org. 
The American College of Commercial Arbitrators published a compendium of'Best Practices' for business 
arbitration. College of Commercial Arbitrators, Guide to Best Practices in Commercial Arbitration (Curtis E. von 
Kann et al. (eds.), 2006); see also, ICC Comm'n on Arbitration, Publ'n No. 843, Techniques for Controlling Time 
and Cost in Arbitration (2007,), available at www.iccwbo.org/uploaded Files/TimeCost_E.pdf; UNCITRAL, 
Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (1996), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ 
arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf. 
For a recent survey of these non-governmental initiatives, see William W. Park, 'Three Studies in Change' in 
Arbitration of International Business Disputes (2006), pp. 3, 45-65. 
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(f) Professional Guidelines 
Among the many professional guidelines on arbitrator comportment, two of the 
most influential include the IBA Guidelines163 and the Code of Ethics issued 
jointly by the American Arbitration Association and the American Bar 
Association.164 Whatever one's views about the wisdom of particular rules, most 
informed observers recognise the rules' far-reaching effects, the latter principally 
for domestic arbitration conducted within the United States and the former with 
respect to most international commercial arbitral proceedings. For want of 
anything better, they get pressed into service to fill the gaps left by overly vague 
institutional rules or lack of foresight by the parties' advisers. 
(i) International Bar Association Guidelines 
Perhaps the most oft-cited of these standards can be found in the IBA 
Guidelines.165 Rightly or wrongly, this list has entered the canon of sacred 
documents cited when an arbitrator's independence is contested. The general 
standards are both objective and subjective. According to the IBA Guidelines, 
arbitrators should decline appointment if they have doubts about their ability to be 
impartial or independent166 or if justifiable doubts exist from a reasonable third 
person's perspective.167 
In practice, the dominant test as elaborated injudicial and institutional decisions 
will be an objective one. Inevitably, challenges by parties will focus on arbitrators 
who have already discounted any self-doubts they might have. Arbitrators who 
consider themselves incapable of performing their duties with integrity will 
normally decline appointment or resign. It would be odd to hear an arbitrator say, 
'Please note that I 'm probably biased. But let me know if you think otherwise'. By 
contrast, the IBA Guidelines set forth a more subjective standard for disclosure, 
requiring communication of facts or circumstances that may 'in the eyes of the 
parties' give rise to doubts about impartiality or independence.168 
A disclosure does not necessarily mean disqualification. Evaluation of the 
potential conflict must be made by the parties as well as whatever body will hear 
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard 2; see Markham Ball, 'Probity Deconstructed: How Helpful, 
Really, are the New International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration?' in (2004) 15 World Arb. and Mediation Rep. 333;Jan Paulsson, 'Ethics and Codes of Conduct for 
a Multi-Disciplinary Institute' in (2004) 70 Arbitration 193 at pp. 198-199. 
The 2004 AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes represents a modification of 
an earlier code adopted in 1977. See generally, Paul D. Friedland and John M. Townsend, 'Commentary on 
Changes to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association' in (2003-2004) 
Disp. Resol. J (November-January) 8; Ben H. Sheppard, Jr, 'A New Era of Arbitrator Ethics for the United 
States' in (2005) 21 Arb. Int'l9\. 
The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest should not be confused with the less controversial IBA Rules of 
Ethics for International Arbitrators. The latter include broad, and somewhat bland, admonitions about 
being competent, diligent, efficient and remaining 'free from bias'. See IBA Rules of Ethics for International 
Arbitrators (1987), rules. 1, 2. 
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard 2(a). 
Ibid. General Standard 2(b). 
Ibid. General Standard 3(1). 
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the challenge.169 In such instances, the relevant test will almost inevitably be 
something along the lines of justifiable doubts in the mind of a reasonable person. 
Excessive disclosure can cause as many problems as inadequate disclosure. If an 
overscrupulous conscience announces links that would not normally raise 
questions, this might cause parties to wonder whether there is more going on than 
meets the eye. 
One of the most useful (albeit controversial) features of the IBA Guidelines lies 
in its enumeration of illustrative elements that create varied levels of arbitrator 
disclosure.170 A 'Red List' describes situations that give rise to justifiable doubts 
about an arbitrator's impartiality. Some are non-waivable (such as a financial 
interest in the outcome of the case), while others (such as a relationship with 
counsel) may be ignored by mutual consent. An 'Orange List' covers scenarios 
(such as past service as counsel for a party) that the parties are deemed to have 
accepted if no objection is made after timely disclosure. Finally, a 'Green List' 
enumerates cases (such as membership in the same professional organisation) that 
require no disclosure. 
(ii) US Rules 
One frequently hears complaints about the 'Americanization' of arbitration,171 
connoting aggressive litigation tactics that include hefty boxes of unmanageable 
exhibits, costly pretrial discovery, and disruptive objections to evidence.172 One 
also notes the internationalisation of US dispute resolution practices, as reflected in 
greater use of written testimony and reasoned awards.173 
In cases of supervised arbitration under the rules of the AAA, ICC or LCIA, an institutional challenge will 
usually be brought prior to any court action. See e.g., AT&T Corp. v. SaudiCable Co. [2000] 2Lloyd'sRep. 127 
(CA) (Eng.), available at 2000 WL 571190, where following a mix-up with various versions of the 
chairman's CV, a challenge was brought for failure to report a position on the board of directors of a 
company that was in direct competition with the losing party in the arbitration. Ibid. 130. An unsuccessful 
challenge before the ICC Court preceded an equally unfruitful attempt to have the award vacated in a 
judicial action at the arbitral seat in London. Ibid. 138. 
See IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at Pt II. 
See e.g., Roger P. Alford, 'The American Influence on International Arbitration' in (2003) 19 Ohio St. J on Disp. 
Resol. 69. This article forms part of a symposium issue, 'The Americanization of International Dispute 
Resolution', which includes contributions by Susan Karamanian, Elena Helmer and Cesare Romano. The 
wider influence of US law has also been noted by Bernard Audit in 'L'Americanisation du droit' in (2001) 
45 Arch, philosophic du droit 7 (Fr.). 
Not all US practices evoke disapproval, however. In a provocative article subtitled 'Why Civil Law 
Arbitrators Apply Common Law Procedures', an eminent Zurich attorney studied the way some 
Continental lawyers can be reborn to an appreciation of Anglo-American litigation techniques such as 
cross-examination and document production. Markus Wirth, 'Ihr Zeuge, Herr Rechtsanwalt! Weshalb Civil 
Law Schiedsrichter Common- Law-Verfahrensrecht anwenden?' in (Jan-Feb 2003) 1 £«'toArc/2 fir 
Schiedsverfahren (Schieds V£ German Arb. J) 8-15. 
See Paul D. Friedland and Ank Santens, 'The Internationalization of American Arbitration' in (2004) News 
and Notes from Inst, for Transnat'l Arb. (Spring) 1. See generally, David Branson, 'American Party-Appointed 
Partisan Arbitrators: Not the Three Monkeys' in (2004) 30 UDayton L Rev. 1; Friedland and Townsend, supra 
n. 164; Bruce Meyerson and John M. Townsend, 'Revised Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators 
Explained'in (2004) Disp. Resol. J (February-April) 10; Sheppard, supra n. 164; Ben H. Sheppard,Jr,'A New 
Era of Arbitration Ethics: the 2004 Revision to the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in 
Commercial Disputes' in (2004) News and Notes from Inst, for Transnat'l Arb. (Spring) 1. 
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Perhaps the most striking example of internationalisation finds itself in the 
evolution of arbitral ethics. Traditionally, US practice presumed party-nominated 
arbitrators to be partisan, and thus permitted ex parte communication with their 
appointers.174 Arbitrators nominated by one side were expected to be non-neutral 
unless explicitly agreed otherwise.175 
Most arbitration conducted within the United States was brought into line with 
global standards requiring independence for all arbitrators. Under the 2004 joint 
AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, a party-nominated arbitrator may be non-neutral only 
if so provided by the parties' agreement, the arbitration rules or applicable law.176 
The new attitude expressed in the Code was reinforced by changes in the 
American Arbitration Association's domestic commercial arbitration rules, 
effective July 2003, establishing a presumption of neutrality for all arbitrators.177 
These rules coexist along with idiosyncrasies of practice among particular 
institutions and states.178 
Readers must be careful not to confuse the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics with 
other US guidelines,179 including recentiy abandoned proposals from within the 
ABA for a 'disclosure checklist'.180 The risk in such guidelines, of course, is that an 
During the proceedings, arbitrators should not engage in ex parte communications about the case with 
counsel. Nevertheless, some institutional rules remain silent on the matter. Notably, the International 
Chamber of Commerce has shown itself reticent to publish an explicit prohibition. See Yves Derains and 
Eric A. Schwartz, A Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (2nd edn, 2005) 131-132; seealso,W. Laurence Craig, 
William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, 2000), para. 13.07, p. 
242 (seeming to acknowledge that a practice of ex parte communication might be agreed by the parties). 
See Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (1977), Canon VII. For a critique of the practice, 
see Seth H. Lieberman, 'Something's Rotten in the State of Party-Appointed Arbitration: Healing ADR's 
Black Eye that is "Nonneutral Neutrals" 'in (2004) 5 CardozoJ Conflict Resol. 215. 
See AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 18 at preamble to Canon X; see generally, 'Report to ABA House of 
Delegates' in (2003/2004) InflArb. News (Winter) 15. 
American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, rule 18 
(applicable unless there has been agreement otherwise) prohibits parties from communicating ex parte with 
an arbitrator, except that parties may communicate with party-nominated (rather than presiding) 
arbitrators (i) to describe the nature of the controversy; or (ii) to discuss selection of a presiding arbitrator. 
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (2007), rule 18. Under rule 12(b), party-
nominated arbitrators must meet general standards of impartiality and independence unless there has been 
agreement otherwise, as permitted by rule 17(a)(iii). Ibid, rule 12(b). 
See e.g., Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving the controversial 
California Ethical Standards for Neutral Arbitrators). In the case at bar, arising under the rules of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, the California standards were found to be pre-empted by the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act. Ibid. 1121. 
The College of Commercial Arbitrators has published useful commentary on the topic. See James H. Carter 
et at, 'Appointment, Disclosures and Disqualification of Neutral Arbitrators' in Guide to Best Practices in 
Commercial Arbitration, supra n. 161 at pp. 7, 7-26. Other thoughtful observations can be found in Lawrence 
W. Newman and Richard D. Hill (eds.), The Leading Arbitrators' Guide to International Arbitration (2nd edn, 2008), 
with contributions by Gerald Aksen (ch. 2 'The Tribunal's Appointment'), Andreas Lowenfeld (ch. 3 'The 
Party-Appointed Arbitrator') and Allan Philip (ch. 5 'The Duties of an Arbitrator'). 
Originally proposed in January 2008 by a subcommittee of the Arbitration Committee of the ABA Dispute 
Resolution Section, the draft 'Best Practices for Meeting Disclosure Requirements' (often called simply the 
'Disclosure Checklist') encountered considerable opposition from within both the ABA Section of 
International Law and the College of Commercial Arbitrators. ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Best 
Practices for Meeting Disclosure Requirements Under the RUAA and Similar Arbitrator Disclosure 
Standards (10 January 2008). In April 2009, the Council of the Dispute Resolution Section refused to 
approve the draft. 
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unhappy loser in an arbitration might take inspiration from the checklist as a 
roadmap for annulment motions. Like the mnemonic devices used by some 
administrative staff at arbitral institutions, checklists and 'rules of thumb' should be 
seen as starting points for analysis rather than black letter destinations.181 
(g) Synthesising Legal Norms 
Decisions of national courts, arbitral institutions and arbitrators (in the case of 
ICSID proceedings) all contribute to the elaboration of what might be called a 
jurisprudence of ethical standards. Those who must rule on disqualification 
motions will inevitably seek some understanding of what others have done in 
analogous cases. Although the decisions do not constitute binding precedent in the 
sense of many national legal systems, they do provide an indication of what others 
consider the right approach, and as such contribute to transnational ethical norms. 
Admittedly, the practice of looking to different sources of authority will not be 
satisfying to those who seek a hierarchy of clear authority within a single legal 
jurisdiction. For better or for worse, however, no such unified judicial system 
governs the world of international economic relations.182 In the world as we find it, 
an approach taking into consideration relevant national and administrative 
practice will likely provide greater predictability and fairness than allowing each 
challenge decision to be fashioned from whole cloth. 
Grounds for challenge often present themselves with slight but relevant factual 
variations. For example, conflicts decisions commonly address an arbitrator's 
relationship with an institution or company that, in turn, has links to one of the 
Mnemonic devices have occasionally been pressed into service. An acronym coined by a long forgotten 
Bostonian runs through five elements for arbitrator disqualification, asking whether a financial or personal 
relationship can be characterised as (i) substantial, (ii) continuing, (iii) recent, (iv) obvious and/or (v) direct. 
The initial letters of each word spell 'SCROD', a name found on menus at New England restaurants to 
describe a white fish in the cod or haddock family, served split and deboned. One might puzzle over the 
attribute 'obvious', given that the temptation to defect from duty remains problematic even if occasioned by 
an otherwise hidden relationship. 
The closest approximation to a supreme court for international law might be found in the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), a body with power to decide cases only when states accept jurisdiction through treaty 
or declaration. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 34-36, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1055. In 
diplomatic protection before the ICJ, foreign investors remain captive to the political predisposition of their 
home countries. Even when a state agrees to sponsor a claim, the Court itself may find the connection 
between the investor and the state insufficient to justify standing. See e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., 
Ltd (Belgium v. Spain, Second Phase) [1970] ICJ 3 (5 February), available at 1970 WL 1 (ICJ) (forbidding 
Belgium from espousing claim of Belgian shareholders in Canadian company). For a rare case in which the 
ICJ did hear an investment dispute, see Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States v. Italy) [1989] ICJ 15 
(20 July), (1989) 28 ILM 1109, available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/76/6707.pdf (finding no host state 
liability when Italy requisitioned US-owned plant to prevent liquidation). See generally, F.A. Mann, 'Foreign 
Investment in the International Court of Justice' in (1992) 86 Am. J Int'l Law 92. 
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parties in the case.183 The potential for taint will depend on the specific nature and 
intensity of the relationship, whether as director, owner, counsel or customer.184 
In an effort to guide both arbitrators and litigants, at least one arbitral 
institution has published sanitised versions of its challenge decisions. A 
compendium of challenges under the rules of the LCIA groups the various 
grounds for disqualification, including the two general rubrics of impartiality or 
independence, as well as the British formulation of a 'duty to act fairly between the 
parties'. 
V. T H R E E R E C U R R I N G P R O B L E M S 
(a) Trivial and 'De Minimis' Contacts 
On a planet where butterflies flap wings in Africa so as to cause Canadian 
snowstorms, clever minds can present scenarios under which most individuals 
might be deemed less than virgin in attitude or predisposition. Experiences or 
relationships might create distant but nevertheless worrisome relationships with 
litigants. Some chance statement by the arbitrator might raise the prospect of 
troubling predilections about controverted issues in the arbitration. 
If a dispute resolution system aims to be useful in a professionally and 
economically interdependent world, some principles of proportionality and 
reasonable nexus must operate to triage between genuine and spurious 
challenges.185 Analysis does not end with the discovery of some remote link 
between arbitrator and dispute. If assessments of arbitrator challenges were 
entirely subjective, ethical standards would become irrelevant to any useful ethical 
canons. 
Notions of de minimis contacts, related to the proximity or intensity of the 
troublesome relationship, have been called into service to evaluate an arbitrator's 
In this respect, several challenges have been rejected with respect to an arbitrator's membership on the 
board of a Swiss bank that managed pension funds and whose portfolio contained shares of one of the 
parties. See Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (claimant Suez, Aguas de Barcelona and 
InterAguas Servicios); Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (claimant Suez, Vivendi and Aguas de 
Barcelona); Electricidad Argentina SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/22 (claimant Electricidad 
Argentina and EDFI); EDF International SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23 (claimant EDF 
International SA, SAUR International SA and Leon Participaciones Argentinas SA). 
In a dispute implicating a manufacturer of household appliances, an arbitrator who owns a dishwasher 
made by the manufacturer would present a very different position from that of an arbitrator who served as 
corporate secretary. An arbitrator who serves on the board of a company with 100,000 customers (one of 
whom has a link with an affiliate of the respondent) would pose different concerns from those obtaining if 
the respondent's affiliate was the principal customer. 
In this connection, one remembers the delightful tirade in Moliere's Don Juan when the valet Sganarelle 
proves the inevitability of his master's damnation by invoking a series of causal links, each plausible on its 
own, but together reaching a conclusion in no way justified by the reasoning. The bird clinging to a branch 
reminded Sganarelle of the duty to cling to moral precepts, and then led him through sky, sea, ships, earth 
and beasts to the conclusion that his miscreant philandering boss was lost forever, which in any event was the 
place that the scandalised wanted to reach from the beginning. Moliere, Don Juan, Act 5, sc. 2. 
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allegedly disqualifying links with one side.186 In this connection, the IBA 
Guidelines attempt to provide concrete criteria forjudging arbitrator relationships 
and predispositions. General Standard 2 of the Guidelines obliges arbitrators to 
resign if they know of facts or circumstances which, from a reasonable person's 
point of view, give rise to 'justifiable doubts' about the arbitrators' impartiality or 
independence.187 In defining justifiable doubts, Standard 2(d) speaks of a 
'significant' economic or personal interest, not fany' interest.188 
Looking to national law for analogies, a de minimis standard can also be found in 
Canon 2 of the American Bar Association 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
, which requires a judge to perform the duties of judicial office impartially, 
competentiy and diligently. Following this general Canon, the ABA Model Code 
provides as follows: 
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:. . . 
(2) The judge knows that the judge . . . has more than a de minimis interest that could be 
substantially affected by the proceeding.189 
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct defines de minimis to mean 'an 
insignificant interest that could not raise a reasonable question regarding the 
judge's impartiality'.190 It also defines 'economic interest' to mean ownership 'of 
more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest'.191 In applying this principle, the 
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct states that an economic interest does not 
include an interest in 'a mutual or common investment fund'.192 
Other jurisdictions with developed arbitration laws take a similar perspective. In 
ATTv. Saudi Cable Co., the English Court of Appeal had to consider the effect of an 
1
 See the concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), 
where Justice White considered it enough that the challenged arbitrator had done 'more than trivial 
business' with one of the parties. Ibid. 152 (White J, concurring). This test was adopted recently by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, AS, 492 
F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007). See also, decisions dismissing the challenges in ICSID cases ARB/03/17 (Suez, Aguas 
de Barcelona and Interagua Servicios v. Argentina) and ARB/03/19 (Suez, Vivendi and Aguas de Barcelona v. Argentina). 
In their decision of 12 May 2008, the remaining arbitrators identified four criteria relevant to their 
colleague's links with the party that had nominated her: (i) proximity of the connections; (ii) intensity of 
interaction; (iii) dependence on the party by virtue of benefits said to have been conferred; and (iv) 
materiality of any benefits allegedly accruing to the arbitrator. The challenge was based on the challenged 
arbitrator's position as a director of a Swiss bank that apparently held portfolio investments in small 
amounts of the claimant companies. 
Standard 2(a) speaks of the arbitrator's subjective 'doubts' while Standard 2(b) refers to an objective test 
based on a 'reasonable third person's point of view'. IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standards 2(a), 
2(b). 
188
 A comment to General Standard 6 discussing troublesome relationships throws further light on the overlap 
of arbitrators' interests with those of their law firm. Explanation 6(a) states that 'the activities of the 
arbitrator's firm should not automatically constitute a conflict of interest'. Rather, each firm activity must be 
considered in the individual case. IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard 6 cmt (a). 
189
 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007), rule 2.11. 
Ibid. Terminology. 
191
 Ibid. 
192
 Ibid. 
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arbitrator's ownership of shares in a telecommunications company in competition 
with one of the parties. Any benefit from the arbitration's outcome that could 
indirectly accrue to the company whose shares were owned by the arbitrator was 
deemed 'of such minimal benefit to [the arbitrator]' that the court held it 
unreasonable to conclude that the arbitrator's share ownership would be a 
relevant influence.193 An insignificant ownership interest in a company will not be 
cause for disqualification. 
The costs of an absolutist perspective will often outweigh any advantages. If 
ethical standards did not include some notion of triviality, it would be unduly easy 
to derail arbitration by asserting a tenuous connection between arbitrators and 
facts that might arguably have an effect on their decisions. A 'no-link-too-small' 
theory would permit removal of arbitrators simply because they occasionally 
socialised with colleagues from the host state. The damage to the stability and 
efficiency of the arbitral process would affect all those who depend on it to provide 
relatively fair and neutral adjudication. 
(b) Saying Too Much Too Early 
Arbitrators may be challenged not just for pecuniary or personal links with one 
side to the dispute, but also when their conduct creates an objective impression of 
having prejudged a case. For example, a procedural order might express 
conclusions about a matter that has not yet been the subject of evidentiary 
hearings, such as reference to ownership of contested property. 
Whether or not such expressions of opinion taint the arbitrator depends very 
much on the facts and circumstances of each case. The context of the order might 
make clear that ownership was presumed merely for the sake of determining 
whether to grant interim relief to prevent assets from being diverted. The 
offending language might be tentative and prima facie with no intention of depriving 
either side of a full and fair hearing on the matter, and inserted in an order with 
qualifying language such as 'if so decided by the Tribunal' or 'on the assumption 
that Claimant is ultimately found to be the owner'. 
Prejudgment causes problems under both the statutory provisions of developed 
legal systems and the rules of most arbitral institutions. The interaction of these 
rules might be illustrated by a hypothetical arbitration in London. The English 
Arbitration Act 1996 establishes mandatory norms that an arbitral tribunal shall 
'act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable 
opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent'.194 A rich 
English case law on 'apparent bias' makes clear that justice must not only be done, 
but must be seen to be done.195 Among the tests proposed by judicial and scholarly 
AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co. [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127, para. 43(c) (CA) (Eng.), available at 2000 WL 
571190. 
Arbitration Act 1996, s. 33(1) (Eng.). 
Cases include R v. Sussex Justices [1924] 1 KB 256; Locabail Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 65; R 
v. Gough [1993] AC 646 (HL); In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No. 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 (CA); 
Porter v. Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 (HL); ASM Shipping Ltd v. TTMI Ltd [2005] EWHC (Coram) 2238; National 
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pronouncements, one that commends itself looks to see whether the circumstances 
of the case would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there 
was a real danger that the tribunal was biased. 
Institutional rules often applied in London follow similar lines. The LCIA Rules 
provide that an arbitrator may be considered unfit if he or she 'does not act fairly 
and impartially as between the parties',196 and that an arbitrator may be 
challenged if 'circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence'.197 Bias under that text includes prejudgment of an 
issue, in the sense of deciding without giving each side an opportunity to present its 
case.198 
(c) Barristers 
(i) Shared chambers 
To the extent London remains one of the great centres for private dispute 
resolution, the role of British barristers takes on a special significance for 
international arbitration. In at least one investor—state case, an arbitral tribunal 
itself held that a barrister should not appear as counsel before another member of 
his chambers.199 Although free to select its lawyers prior to constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, the respondent was not entitled to change the composition of its 
legal team in a way that might imperil the tribunal's legitimacy.200 The tribunal 
found no absolute bar to barristers from the same chambers being involved as 
counsel and arbitrator in the same case, but found equally no absolute rule to the 
opposite effect. Consequently, the justifiability of an apprehension of bias would 
depend upon 'all relevant circumstances'.201 
Barristers, the arm of the legal profession most often charged with actually 
arguing cases, traditionally practise from 'chambers' that bear both similarities 
Assembly for Wales v. Condron [2006] EWCA(Civ) 1573; Hagop Ardahalian v. Unifert International SA (The Elisssar) 
[1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 206 (QB); AWG Group Ltd v. Morrison [2006] EWCA (Civ) 6; Modern Engineering (Bristol) 
Ltd v. C. Miskin and Son Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 135 (CA); R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, 
Pinochet M. 2 [2000] 1 AC 199 (HL); Gillies \. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 WLR 781 (HL); 
and Flaherty v. National Greyhound Racing Club [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1117. See also discussion supra. 
LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 10.2. 
Ibid. art. 10.3. 
Sometimes it is said that a party-nominated arbitrator should possess maximum predisposition and 
minimum bias. Although the value of this unduly cute saying remains doubtful, it is true that for 
international arbitration, the party-nominee often plays a special role in assisting the presiding arbitrator to 
understand arguments that may otherwise be less accessible, due to differences in legal culture. 
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, ddv. Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24 (2008) (implicating claims by a Croatian 
entity before a tribunal composed of David Williams (Chairman), Jan Paulsson and Charles Brower). It was 
determined that David Mildon (appointed co-counsel of the respondent) could not participate further in the 
case because Messrs Mildon and Williams were both members of Essex Court Chambers. 
Article 56 of the ICSID Convention stresses the stability of properly constituted tribunals, providing that a 
tribunal's composition shall remain unchanged except for death, incapacity or resignation. ICSID 
Convention, Art. 56. The continued appearance of Mr Mildon might have undermined the legitimacy of 
the tribunal by giving an appearance of impropriety, or by requiring resignation of Mr Williams, the 
tribunal's Chairman. 
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, supra n. 199, Decision on Jurisdiction para. 31. 
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and differences when compared with law firms in general. The chambers include 
shared office space and administrative assistants styled as clerks, as well as the 
normal amenities of law practice such as word processors, fax machines and 
photocopiers. Younger lawyers receive guidance and referrals from more senior 
members. 
Most barristers seem to reject application of the conflict-of-interest rules that 
would normally be relevant to practice within a law firm. Considering themselves 
independent and self-employed, sharing expenses but not revenues,202 barristers 
see no reason why two members of the same chambers should refrain from acting 
for opposite sides of an arbitration, or why one should not sit as arbitrator in a case 
where another serves as advocate. 
Not all are convinced, however, that the integrity of proceedings remains 
uncompromised when barristers from one set of chambers serve as arbitrator and 
counsel in the same arbitration. Shared profits are not the only type of professional 
relationships that can create potential conflicts. Senior barristers often have 
significant influence on the progress of junior colleagues' careers. Moreover, 
London chambers increasingly brand themselves as specialists in particular fields, 
with senior 'clerks' taking on marketing roles for the chambers, sometimes 
travelling to stimulate collective business. Moreover, a barrister's success means an 
enhanced reputation, which in turn reflects on the chambers as a whole.203 
In response to doubts about the ethics of their practice, some barristers suggest 
that outsiders just do not understand the system, characterising the critiques as 
naive. Like a Paris waiter impugning a tourist's ability to speak French in order to 
distract him from insisting on the correct change, the critique aims to camouflage 
what is at stake. Often, however, outsiders do understand the mechanics of 
chambers. They simply evaluate the dangers differently. 
(ii) International Bar Association Guidelines 
The position under English law is what it is.204 This does not prevent justifiable 
doubts from arising among parties to international arbitration concerning 
independence as between two barristers of the same chambers in a single 
proceeding. Under the IBA Guidelines, the 'Orange List' Section 3.3 includes 
See e.g., R. Pillai, 'Independence and Impartiality: the Situation of English Barristers Acting in Arbitrations' 
in (2008) Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt (July), www.transnational- dispute-management.com/ (subscription only); 
David Branson, 'Note on Hrvatska Elektropriveda v. Republic of Slovenia' in (2009) 25 Arb. Int'l. 615. 
Sceptics also note that salaried legal associates in the United States and other countries assume the conflicts 
of their firm affiliation even without sharing in profits. 
At least one English case has rejected a challenge to an arbitrator who shares chambers with a barrister 
serving as advocate in the same case. See Laker Airways Inc. v. FLS Aerospace Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 45 (QB) 
(judgment of RixJ, as he then was). A more nuanced view, however, may be evolving. See e.g., Smith v. Kvaemer 
Cementation Foundations Ltd [2006] EWCA (Civ) 242, [2006] 3 All ER 593 (CA) (involving litigation for 
personal injuries sustained in a road accident). Both sides' barristers and the Recorder (legal officer acting 
as magistrate within a given locality) were from the same chambers. On appeal from a judgment against the 
claimant Smith, the Court of Appeal expressed concern that the claimant's barrister had not properly 
explained to his client the complexity of the matter. The judgment was reversed, with Mr Smith's waiver 
found to be ineffective. 
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relationships 'between an arbitrator and another arbitrator or counsel'.205 As 
mentioned earlier, this non-exhaustive iteration of various fact patterns covers 
common scenarios that, depending on the circumstances of each case, might give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to arbitrator impartiality or independence in the eyes of 
the parties. The arbitrator thus has a duty to disclose problematic facts, which the 
parties are deemed to have accepted if no timely objection is made following 
disclosure.206 
The Orange List's broad category of'[r]elationship[s] between an arbitrator 
and another arbitrator or counsel' is amplified by Section 3.3.1, which includes a 
situation where 'the arbitrator and another arbitrator are lawyers in the same law 
firm'.207 This is supplemented in Section 3.3.3 by a further enumeration of 
troublesome relationships, to include an arbitrator who was 'within the past three 
years a partner or colleague of, or otherwise affiliated with, another arbitrator or 
any of the counsel in the same arbitration'.208 
A special provision covers barristers, however. The Orange List, a non-
exhaustive enumeration of fact patterns that 'may' give rise to justified doubts, 
includes the following relationship: 'The arbitrator and another arbitrator or the 
counsel for one of the parties are members of the same barristers' chambers'.209 
The IBA Guidelines' inclusion of this category was not without debate or 
objection, and became the subject of a discussion in the 'Background' report issued 
by the IBA Working Group.210 
(Hi) Collegiality and the 'outside' arbitrator 
When barristers from the same chambers oppose each other as advocates, each 
wants to show special cleverness. Competitive juices work against inappropriate 
behaviour. Incentives to deviate from duty normally remain outweighed by the 
goal of proving oneself the better gladiator. Similar considerations reduce risks 
when one barrister serves as arbitrator while another (from the same chambers) 
acts as counsel. 
Different factors operate, however, when two barristers from the same chambers 
sit together as arbitrators and exclude meaningful participation by the third 
member of the tribunal.211 Their bilateral deliberations remain outside the reach 
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at Pt II, s. 3.3. 
Ibid. General Standard 4(a). 
Ibid. Pt II, s. 3.3.1. 
Ibid. Pt II, s. 3.3.3. 
Ibid. Pt II, s. 3.3.2. 
Otto L.O. de Witt Wijnen et al., 'Background Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration' in (2004) 5 Bus. L Int'l 433 at pp. 455^156, available at www.ibanet.org/images/ 
downloads/Background%20 Information.pdf. The IBA Working Group notes the distinction between the 
operation of law firms and barristers chambers (including differences among barristers in different 
jurisdictions) but then adds: 'in light of the content of the promotional material which many chambers now 
disseminate, there is an understandable perception that barristers' chambers should be treated the same way 
as law firms'. Ibid. p. 455. 
The situation is more troubling in some types of disputes than in others. For example, in 'Bermuda Form' 
insurance arbitrations, the insurers invariably appoint a senior barrister, and often insist on another barrister 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/arbitration/article-abstract/27/3/473/250636 by Boston U
niversity user on 05 D
ecem
ber 2019
Rectitude in International Arbitration 519 
of party scrutiny. The junior of the two barristers might draft the award for the 
senior to present as 'our award' to the third arbitrator, followed perhaps by a 
perfunctory conference call replacing genuine deliberations. 
When a same-chambers relationship is apparent from the start, the litigants will 
have renounced any objection to composition of the tribunal as such. This does not 
mean, however, that they waive integrity and good faith in the tribunal's internal 
communications, which form an essential part of due process. Parties who stipulate 
three arbitrators have a right to expect that all will be allowed to participate in 
discussions. 
Exclusion of the third arbitrator derives not from any inherent wickedness in the 
two affiliated barristers, but from the moral hazard implicit in any hidden in-group 
complicity and facilitated by the confidential nature of deliberations. Enlightened 
English arbitrators will remain concerned to avoid the appearance of impropriety 
in dealings with each other. Nevertheless, when busy barristers have the 
opportunity to save time by deciding as a two-some, the temptation exists that a 
'short-on-time' card will be played to justify procedural irregularity, much as a 
street thief might invoke the 'short-on-cash' defence to explain bag snatching.212 
VI . I N T E L L E C T U A L I N T E G R I T Y 
(a) Baby Splitting 
Even if not biased or corrupt, arbitrators may lack intellectual integrity if they fail to 
decide disputes according to the mission conferred upon them by the parties. If 
evidence indicates that a clearly right answer to a dispute does exist, arbitrators 
deviate from duty if they render compromise decisions without being so authorised 
by the parties. 
In this connection, one sometimes hears complaints of 'splitting the baby', a 
reference to awards not justified by facts or law.213 One strain in US legal literature 
as chairman. The dispute resolution clauses in such cases represent a compromise between the American 
policy-holders and the non-American insurance companies, with London as the situs and New York law as 
applicable to the merits of contract interpretation. The insurers' reasoning runs that an English barrister is 
needed to understand how to conduct a London proceeding. The logic is not self-evident, given that the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 imposes no preference whatsoever for English rules on procedural and 
evidential matters, but leaves them to the discretion of the tribunal and the parties. Arbitration Act 1996, s. 
34 (Eng.). On 'Bermuda Form' arbitration, see generally, Richard Jacobs et al., Liability Insurance in International 
Arbitration: The Bermuda Form (2004). 
On good practice in arbitral deliberations, see generally, Yves Derains, 'La pratique du delibere arbitral' in 
Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner 
(2005), p. 221. M. Derains distinguishes between harmonious and pathological deliberations. In the latter 
situation he suggests that a first draft of the award is to be prepared by the chairman alone, and presented 
at a fixed meeting for deliberations. Ibid. para. 12, p. 229. Of course, a different practice may obtain when 
informal discussions among the tribunal members lead to a consensus that the merits favour one side or the 
other, or when issues can easily be parcelled for drafting after general agreement has been reached. All three 
arbitrators may agree that no credible evidence supports the claim, or that one arbitrator has expertise that 
can be pressed into service in drafting an award along lines previously accepted by all. 
The imagery of baby-splitting seems to originate in the Biblical child custody dispute decided in ancient 
Jerusalem by King Solomon. When one woman accused another of stealing her baby, the King called for a 
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suggests that arbitrators are pushed toward unprincipled decisions in order to 
attract business through reappointment.214 
Although some arbitrators might behave that way, most remain puzzled by 
assertions that 'incentives' promote improper comportment. No empirical data 
permits a firm conclusion on the matter, at least not from variations in records of 
'win rates' to the extent they can be determined215 or the size of damages in 
arbitration as opposed to court litigation.216 Moreover, existing studies focus on 
employment and consumer controversies,217 which present concerns different from 
those present in business-to-business cases.218 
As mentioned earlier, the contention that arbitrators render sloppy decisions 
with the hope of greater gain for themselves runs counter to logic as well as 
evidence, at least for complex international cases amongst sophisticated parties. 
Successful arbitrators gain reputations by rendering awards that reflect fidelity to 
sword so the child might be divided in two, with one half for each woman. Of course, the metaphor hides 
the character of Solomon's decision as an interim award, followed by grant of custody to the real mother 
whose compassion led to abandonment of her claim in hopes of saving her son. 1 Kings 3:23-28. 
214
 See e.g., Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), pp. 127-128 (asserting that courts and juries are 'more 
likely to adhere to the law and less likely than arbitrators to "split the difference" between the two sides 
thereby lowering damages' (quoting Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, 6 P. 3d 669, 693 (Cal. 
2000))); see also, Alon Klement and Kvika Neeman, 'Does Private Selection Improve the Accuracy of 
Arbitrators' Decisions' (28 March 2009) (workshop paper, on file with author). 
A claimant awarded US$100 on a US$5 million claim 'wins' in the sense of receiving something. However, 
the respondent would likely be the happier of the two parties. The distinction between rates of success in 
proving liability and the amounts of awards is discussed more fully in Eisenberg and Hill, infra n. 216. 
See Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill, 'Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical 
Comparison' in (2003-2004) Disp. Resol. J (November-January) 44, looking at state and federal court trials 
as compared with AAA arbitrations. In non-civil rights disputes, higher paid employees (earning over 
US$60,000 per year) generally prevailed at greater rates (64 per cent) in arbitration than in state court 
(56 per cent). For lower paid employees the win rate was 39 per cent. However, the size of the mean award 
was greater in court cases, at US$462,000 for courts compared with US$211,000 for higher paid employees 
in arbitration and US$30,000 for lower paid employees in arbitration. Looking to the median (rather than 
mean) award, the higher paid employees actually received more in arbitration (US$94,000) than in court 
litigation (US$68,000). Ibid.; see William M. Howard, 'Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, 
What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?' in (1995) Disp. Resol. J (October-December) 40; 
David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research' 
in (2005) 57 Stan. LRev. 1557, 1567-1578; Adriaan Lanni, 'Case Note, Protecting Public Rights in Private 
Arbitration' in (1998) 107 Yale LJ 1157. 
Yet another category to consider would be 'grievance' cases arising pursuant to collective bargaining 
agreements in the United States, often called 'labor union' arbitration. Some colleagues have suggested to 
the author privately that arbitrators in 'grievance' cases sometimes endorse untruthful results as a 
component of enhancing industrial cooperation and goodwill between company and union. In that context, 
the arbitrator's role seems to include both a truth-seeking and a peace-making function. 
It may be that obtaining legal counsel for court cases precludes the less wealthy from commencing litigation 
except when attorneys will take matters on a contingency fee. More significantly perhaps, civil juries might 
be unduly sympathetic to the 'little guy' (consumer or employee) in a battle against the 'big guy' 
(manufacturer, bank or boss). In hearing a lender's claims against a borrower, it would not be surprising if 
the jury included individuals who themselves had 'run-ins' with banks or brokers related to items such as 
home mortgages, car loans or pension funds. Although not immune from such emotions, the arbitrators as 
professional decision-makers might tend to decide more in tune with the evidence. If so, court damages 
might be too high rather than arbitral damages too low. Finally, it may be that the legal cost of going to court 
(which would arguably be greater than for arbitration, at least in the United States) imposes a certain 
selection on the cases that are actually pushed to trial, with the employee less likely to find an attorney 
willing to pursue small or doubtful claims on a contingency basis. 
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the parties' shared ex ante expectations, establishing track records for 
understanding difficult factual and legal matrices. Moreover, arbitrators sitting on 
three-member tribunals have far more to gain from demonstrating intellectual 
integrity to each other (thus enhancing positive references for future cases) than in 
urging disregard of the right result.219 
(b) Amiable Composition 
In some circumstances, of course, the parties may in essence authorise compromise 
by empowering the arbitrator to depart from the terms of the contract or the strict 
rigours of otherwise applicable law. French law has long recognised the role of an 
arbitrator authorised to act as an 'amiable compositeur', sometimes referred to as 
'amiable composition', to describe the process rather than the person.220 Such 
power may be granted explicitly by contract,221 or through incorporation by 
reference to institutional rules such as those of the International Chamber of 
Commerce.222 
The arbitrator authorised by the parties to act as amiable compositeur may 
disregard or temper rules of law whose strict applications would violate equity 
under the circumstances.223 Examples include adjustment of payment date due to 
substantial completion of construction projects, price changes due to alternation in 
the fundamental economic balance between the parties, proportionality for 
liquidated damages, adjustment of contract terms in the event of unexpected 
inflation or exchange rate modification, and extension of statutes of limitation.224 
Any 'horse trading' on a three-member tribunal will usually occur as accommodation on issues as to which 
reasonable arbitrators might differ. In a construction case, for example, one arbitrator might see the 
evidence of defective workmanship in the turbine blades, while another might not. The first arbitrator might 
agree to reflect more on the turbine blades, while asking his colleagues to think again about her conclusions 
on the quality of the cement mix. Such give-and-take represents no more than an attempt to reach consensus 
on complex matters, thus permitting the type of unanimous award that more easily withstands potential 
challenge. 
See Nouveau code de procedure civile (NCPC), art. 1474 (Fr.), translated in The French Code of Civil Procedure 
in English (Christian Dodd (trans.), 2005), applicable in purely domestic arbitrations, and NCPC, art. 1497, 
applicable in international cases, defined to include arbitrations that 'implicate the interests of international 
commerce'. NCPC, art. 1492 provides, 'Un arbitrage qui met en cause des interets du commerce 
international'. Ibid. art. 1492. 
For arbitration outside France, the role of amiable compositeur conferred by contract may assume less precise 
contours than those provided under French law, a bit like the way 'due process' has come to be used in 
transborder arbitration with a meaning that does not necessarily coincide with its significance in the United 
States Constitution. 
ICC Rules, art. 17(3), allows arbitrators to assume the powers of amiable compositeur only if agreed by the 
parties. 
See generally, Eric Loquin, L'amiable composition en droit compare et international: Contribution a I'etude du non-droit dans 
l'arbitrage commercial (1980) (Fr.) (proposing in the title an interesting juxtaposition by the use of non-droit 
(non-law) after the colon and droit compare (comparative law) before); see also, Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra 
n. 174 at para. 8.05, pp. 110-114; Jean-Louis Delvolve et al, French Arbitration Law and Practice (2003), paras 
276-295, pp. 151-161. 
For an empirical study of decisions ex aequo et bono (as discussed infra, a close cousin or even sister to amiable 
composition), see Martim Delia Valle, Decisoes por Equidade na Arbitragem Comercial Internacional (doctoral thesis, 
University of Sao Paulo, May 2009), ch. 8, pp. 372-402 (copy on file with author), translated in On Decisions 
ex Aequo et Bono in International Commercial Arbitration (2009), ch. 8, pp. 188-121. 
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In stipulating to amiable composition, parties pursue a different sort of truth from 
what would otherwise be sought by those deciding the dispute.225 Rather than 
aiming at legal accuracy, the arbitrators reach toward general notions of 'right' 
encrusted with emotional overtones and sometimes in tension with court decisions, 
statutes or strict contract terms.226 
A long-standing debate surrounds whether amiable composition amounts to the 
same thing as decision-making ex aequo et bono, according to the 'right and good'.227 
Although the terms are often used interchangeably, the notion of amiable 
composition may connote a broader range of options. Arbitrators deciding in 
amiable composition could go directly to their preferred solution without first 
asking whether the applicable law produces a clearly unfair result. In the 
alternative, they could start with a national law and then depart, if necessary, to 
achieve the 'right' result. The latter approach defines amiable composition by a 
negative, in that the arbitrators are not required to apply rules of law. By contrast, 
the former path corresponds to ex aequo et bono in taking shape in a more positive 
way, beginning and ending with the arbitrators' private sense of justice.228 
Of course, arbitrators can very well reach an equitable result by applying 
applicable legal norms. In such instances there is no need to reinvent the wheel by 
seeking some novel 'non-law' solution to the parties' problem.229 
Some commentators suggest that amiable composition would permit avoidance of what they term 'technical 
legal constraints' in order to reach 'conclusions that are fair and just'. See Wells and Ahmed, supra n. 87 at p. 
294. One wonders from whose perspective (investors or host states) the 'fair and just' label would be applied. 
Only in a very limited sense does amiable composition overlap notions of public policy. Although policy 
serves as a defence to contract claims, its function lies not in doing justice but in making sure a contract is 
not enforced in a way that violates the forum's most basic notions of justice and morality. Public policy has 
long been seen as an 'unruly horse' in that once astride the animal, we never know where it will carry us. See 
Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229 at 252, in which one Captain Richardson sued for reinstatement as 
master of the ship Minerva, which respondent appears to have given to his nephew, allegedly contravening a 
policy of that day against selling command of important vessels. 
ICC Rules, art. 17(3) mentions both the role of an amiable compositeur and ex aequo et bono in the same 
sentence, speaking of a tribunal that shall 'assume the powers of an amiable compositeur' or 'decide ex aequo et 
bono'. ICC Rules, art. 17(3). The French version follows a similar structure: 'Le tribunal arbitral statue en 
amiable compositeur ou decide ex aequo et bono'. In this connection, art. 17 mentions both 'amiable 
compositieur' and 'ex aequo et bono' in the same sentence, speaking of a tribunal that shall 'assume the powers of 
an amiable compositeur' or 'decide ex aequo et bono'. Ibid. The French version follows a similar structure: 'Le 
tribunal arbitral statue en amiable compositeur ou decide ex aequo et bono'. This construction seems to 
leave open more than one reading. In some instances, 'or' joins distinct notions ('arbitrators may decide 
according to law or according to equity'), while on other occasions, 'or' simply suggests slight variations on 
roughly the same theme ('citizens may worship according to the dictates of their personal faith or belief 
system'). 
A slightly different perspective is taken in Philippe Fouchard et al., Traite de I'arbitrage commercial international 
(1996), para. 1502, pp. 836-837.. The authors seem to admit the negative manner for defining amiable 
composition, and the option either to proceed direcdy to justice or first to consider the applicable law. 
Nevertheless, they suggest that such a nuance lacks significance ('une telle distinction . . . paraft artificielle') 
because the arbitrators can always do what they think justice requires. 
See Matthieu de Boisseson, Le droit Jrancais de I'arbitrage (1990), para. 371, p. 315 (suggesting that equity 
remains the goal ('le but') not the means (' [le] moyen') of amiable composition). 
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(c) Creeping Legalism 
Ironically, a parallel critique increasingly presents itself in connection with 
arbitrators who allegedly show too much rigidity in their decision-making. 
Mediation proponents often disparage arbitration as burdened with undue 
formality, suggesting that the arbitral process has fallen prey to 'creeping 
legalism'.230 
Sometimes, of course, the critique will be justified. Few argue against the search 
for better ways to balance fairness and efficiency, or suggest that corporate 
managers should learn to relish the legal bills and waste of time on unnecessary 
litigation. It is usually better to give peace a chance before starting litigation, and 
often wise to avoid costly 'scorched earth' practices that have become legendary in 
US courts. 
On occasion, however, the critique forgets that impartial arbitrators must 
establish the facts and ascertain the law by weighing evidence and listening to 
argument. Arbitration aims at a binding result, as close as possible to the shared ex 
ante expectations memorialised in the relevant contract or investment treaty. The 
conscientious arbitrator will normally adopt procedures whose level of formality 
withstands ethical scrutiny.231 
Mediation is different, and can no more substitute for arbitration than a dinner 
date can replace a wedding, or a train trip between Boston and Washington can 
replace a flight between New York and Hong Kong. Arbitration aims at a binding 
result imposed regardless of the parties' ex post will. Mediation succeeds only when 
both sides agree. 
Another seductive but problematic argument suggests that business managers 
no longer want due process at the cost of simplicity. Rather, so the argument goes, 
they just want a streamlined way out of their commercial mess.232 
In this connection, one notes the discussion of what 'users' want from international arbitration, a topic 
discussed in the CPR-sponsored International Dispute Negotiation (IDN) Podcast of 21 November 2008, 
conducted by Michael Mcllwrath, Senior Counsel, Litigation for GE Infrastructure, Oil and Gas, based in 
Florence, Italy. Mr Mcllwrath interviewed Mr Volker Mahnken, senior counsel of Siemens AG, with respect 
to the article that the latter co-authored with Messrs Paul Hoebeck and Max Kroebke entitled 'Time for 
Woolf Reforms in International Construction Arbitration' in (2008) 11 Int'lArb. L Rev. 84 at pp. 84—99. The 
authors suggest some equivalent of the 1999 reform of civil procedure in England and Wales to address what 
was perceived as dissatisfaction among the main consumers of international construction arbitration, which 
is considered too long, too expensive and too adversarial. Proposed reforms include more intensive ('front 
loaded') pleadings at an earlier stage and more aggressive case management by arbitrators. See Gerald F. 
Phillips, 'Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?' in (2003) Disp. Resol J (February-April) 37; David W. 
Rivkin, 'Towards a New Paradigm in International Arbitration: the Town Elder Model Revisited' in (2008) 
24 Art. Ml 375. 
In commercial arbitration, the litigants are normally also the parties to the agreement giving rise to the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction. By contrast, for treaty-based investor-state proceedings, the investor's home 
country (not the investor) is the party to the BIT or free trade agreement, but not the arbitration itself. Thus, 
pre-dispute expectations contemplate those shared by the two contracting states, each of which stand as 
surrogates for the perspective of their own investors as well as interests related to their roles as host states. 
See e.g., Jean-Claude Najar, 'Inside Out: a User's Perspective on Challenges in International Arbitration' in 
(2009) 25 Arb. Int'l. 515, After cataloguing the defects of international arbitration today, the author 
concludes, 'By whatever means necessary, arbitration needs to be repaired, to be returned to its simple 
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Such generalisations beg the more difficult question of what should happen 
when no consensus can be reached on how to streamline. The two sides can always 
simplify things in a post-dispute procedural agreement. Often, however, the 
hypothetical 'they' who seek simplicity turns out not to be the third person plural 
at all. Instead, one side advocates some procedural measure that the other side 
resists as fundamentally unfair. Absent both sides' consent to simplified procedural 
protocols, ethical arbitrators must seek the best indication of the parties' shared ex 
ante procedural expectations as memorialised in their arbitration clause and the 
context of their dispute.233 
(d) Arbitrators and the Search for Truth 
Matters that 'go without saying' often bear saying nevertheless. Any consideration 
of arbitrator integrity reveals an intriguing intersection among three notions: due 
process, conflicts of interest and the search for truth. 
Arbitrators are supposed to arrive at some understanding of what actually 
happened and what legal norms determine the parties' claims and defences. In 
finding facts and applying law, arbitrators should aim at getting as near as 
reasonably possible to a correct view of the events giving rise to the controversy, 
and to consider legal norms applied in other disputes that raise similar questions. 
This does not mean that arbitrators do not balance truth-seeking against other 
goals. Indeed, they do so all the time, notably in connection with document 
production (which competes with economy and speed) and attorney-client 
privilege (which inhibits attempts to get at what corporate officers really knew). 
However, such balancing of interests does not require abandonment of truth-
seeking as an aspiration. 
Parties to commercial or investment disputes can always decide to resolve 
matters through combat, rolling dice or consulting the entrails of a disemboweled 
chicken. Duels, gambling and augury find little favour these days, however. 
Arbitration usually imposes itself faute de mieux where mediation has failed and 
neither side wants to end up in the other side's courts, thus attaching a premium 
on the search for truth. 
This trivial point, that arbitration implicates a reasoned evaluation of facts and 
legal norms, explains why analogies to practices applicable in other types of 
non-judicial dispute resolution usually fall short.234 In choosing arbitration, the 
foundations—speed, cost efficiency, and user-friendliness'. Of course, only time will tell how far in-house 
counsel will go in accepting the 'whatever means necessary' when the fortunes of their own companies are 
at stake. 
In this connection, the American Arbitration Association through its affiliate International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution (ICDR) has adopted default rules on information exchange making clear that parties to 
ICDR arbitration should not expect US court-style discovery. See Guidelines for Arbitrators Concerning 
Exchanges of Information (ICDR 2008), available at www.adr. org/si.asp?id=5288. For better or for worse, 
neither the International Chamber of Commerce nor the London Court of International Arbitration has 
followed suit with any similar guidelines. 
See William W. Park, Truth-Seeking in International Arbitration, in The Search for Truth in Arbitration 1 (Swiss 
Arbitration Association, 2011); see also, Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The JVew Litigation , 2010 U. Ill L. 
Rev. 1 (January 2010), at 27-38. 
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parties have not sought simply to make peace, noble as that goal might be. Rather, 
they have committed to a decision-making process founded on a search for an 
accurate portrayal of the facts and the law. Business managers who want simply to 
reach a solution to their conflict can always agree to a decision that ignores the law 
and the facts. 
Arbitrators normally have no power to rewrite the parties' agreement, even if 
one side regrets having agreed to arbitration.235 The common sense of this 
hypothesis can be tested if one imagines the surprise of a corporate general counsel 
who, believing she had a 'good case' on the law, facts and contract interpretation, 
received an award stating that the arbitrator had decided to grant each side half of 
what it requested because that seemed like the fair thing to do. 
VII. T H E OBJECT OF A N ARBITRATOR'S D U T I E S 
In a world lacking global commercial courts of mandatory jurisdiction,236 
arbitration provides one way to bolster confidence in cross-border economic 
cooperation. Without binding private dispute resolution, many business 
transactions would remain unconsummated from fear of the other side's 
hometown justice. Or, they would be concluded at higher costs to reflect the 
greater risk due to the absence of adequate mechanisms to vindicate contract 
rights or investment expectations. 
In consequence, arbitrator integrity takes on significance not only for the direct 
participants in cross-border trade and investment, but also for the wider global 
community whose welfare is directly affected by the arbitral process. Even if 
universally accepted standards of conduct remain elusive, all communities 
implicated by cross-border arbitration must continue a dialogue on the subject that 
at the least will help to identify wrong directions and false solutions. 
Arbitration's broader impact raises propositions of whether an arbitrator's 
ethical obligations flow to society at large rather than simply to the litigants. The 
answer, perhaps unsatisfying to ideologues, remains 'sometimes'. 
As an initial matter, one must be cautious about unselective attempts to 
transplant judicial standards into the world of arbitration. Given a judge's clear 
obligations to the citizenry as a whole, the calculus of judicial duties will differ from 
what might be expected of arbitrators who remain principally (albeit not 
exclusively) creatures of the litigants' contracts. 
For example, if urged by parties mindful of costs, an arbitrator might accept 
proceedings with reduced due process, even if not willing to go so far as looking 
into a crystal ball. By contrast, a judge may not feel comfortable abandoning 
In practice, of course, a corporate officer may decide to resist compromise under the assumption that his 
company has a stronger position than the adversary, coming to regret that decision only when the arbitral 
tribunal finds for the other side. 
Regional bodies such as the European Court of Justice do exist in the context of treaties for economic union, 
but would have no authority, for example, in a dispute between a French societe anonyme and an American 
corporation, or between a Chinese trading entity and a Brazilian Sociedad Limitada. 
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state-imposed procedural mandates, even if so requested by litigants seeking a 
cheaper and quicker process. The state that pays the judge's salary sets the broad 
contours of the relevant procedure. Of course, there are limits to what arbitrators 
will do at the request of parties. Few will condone arbitration as a tool for money 
laundering237 or proceedings designed to falsify what actually happened.238 
In most instances, public and private goals will coincide, with each having a very 
real interest in the systemic integrity of the arbitral process. Seeking to decide 
disputes fairly as between the parties, arbitrators will normally adopt practices that 
comport with public concerns about basic procedural due process. The just 
enforcement of private contracts will normally promote the societal interest in 
promise-keeping and respect for bargains that underpin most cross-border 
commercial or financial cooperation. 
Arbitrators thus bear a responsibility of the utmost seriousness to be mindful of 
the integrity of their proceedings when seeking an optimum balance between 
fairness and efficiency. Those who break faith with this duty make the world a 
poorer place. 
To move embezzled funds abroad, a corrupt official might conclude a contract with a foreign entity, 
controlled by the official's equally corrupt colleagues overseas. When the government fails to perform its 
obligations, arbitration, sometimes with honest arbitrators unaware of what has happened, would lead to an 
award whose execution ultimately implicates an unlawful transfer of funds abroad. For one case raising such 
suspicions, see Gulf Petro Trading Co., Inc. v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2008), 
discussed in Thomas Walsh, 'Collateral Attacks and Secondary Jurisdiction in International Arbitration' in 
(2009)25 4r*. 7 s m 3 3 . 
A recent California case illustrates the potential for misuse of the arbitral process in employment law. Nelson 
v. Am. Apparel, Inc., No. B205937, 2008 WL 4713262 (Cal. Ct. App. October 28, 2008). The case implicated 
the founder of American Apparel, reported to have been the object of at least three sexual harassment 
lawsuits. In one, a strange piece of post-setdement theatre involved payment of more than US$ 1 million to 
an employee who apparendy accepted a sham arbitration by a retired judge whose 'award' would stipulate 
facts and findings in the company's favour. 
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